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The impacts of network effects and multi-service provision on consumer switching costs 
in the Swedish telecommunications market 
Pratompong Srinuan 
Department of Technology Management and Economics 
Chalmers University of Technology 
ABSTRACT 
The Swedish telecommunications market has been liberalised since 1990s. Liberalisation gave an 
opportunity to several new entrants to enter to the market. Consumers also gained benefits from more 
telecom providers and services to choose from, and lower telecom prices. The Swedish telecom market 
is now more competitive than it was in the pre-liberalisation period. However, the telecom market is 
somewhat different from other markets. Network effects and high consumer switching costs are main 
features and crucial issues for competition in this market. Incumbent operators tend to use some 
induced network effects strategies, such as tariff-mediated network effects, local network effects, and 
multi-service provision to raise switching costs of consumers and gain more competitive advantages. 
The thesis aims to investigate the impacts of two main strategies of telecom providers, network effects 
and multi-service provision, on consumer switching costs. The impacts of tariff-mediated network 
effects and local network effects have been examined in the Swedish mobile communications market. 
The findings suggest that tariff-mediated network effects can lock-in existing mobile subscribers to 
larger mobile operators. Interestingly, tariff-mediated network effects could not be used by larger 
mobile operators to gain new mobile subscribers during the period of study. However, larger mobile 
operators can potentially utilize tariff-mediated network effects to increase their market share in later 
stages. In addition, the results show that local network effects can create switching barriers, 
particularly for customers of larger mobile operators since they receive lower monthly bills than 
customers of smaller operators. Hence, they are less likely to switch to smaller operators.  
Furthermore, most of telecom providers in Sweden are multi-service provision providers. They 
provide various broadband access technologies and several telecom services. The empirical results 
reveal that mobile broadband (MB) is a substitution service to fixed broadband (FB). Broadband 
providers can encourage their customers to migrate from MB to FB technology within the same 
carrier. This suggests that multi-service provision in broadband Internet access can raise consumer 
switching costs. Additionally, the results also show that multi-service providers can utilize their 
economies of scope together with a discount to create switching costs for their customers, since 
consumers tend to buy more telecom services from them. This indicates that the current consumers of 
these providers are locked in. Search costs and the uncertain costs may also encourage consumers to 
use the service from the service provider of which they already have experience. Therefore, multi-
service providers who have a dominant position in a specific telecom service could utilize their 
position to encourage their existing customers to buy more services. 
The thesis provides policy recommendations to reduce consumer switching costs and enhance the level 
of competition in the telecom market. A bill-and-keep interconnection scheme is proposed to reduce 
and prevent the potential impacts of tariff-mediated network effects. A bill-and-keep can also hinder 
incumbents from setting a high termination charge to raise the off-net prices of their rivals. 
Additionally, revised broadband market definitions should be instituted since there is evidence of 
substitution between MB and FB. The market for bundle services also needs to be explicitly defined. 
Precise market definitions will lead to more accurate market analysis. 
Keywords: switching costs, termination-based price discrimination, calling clubs, tariff-mediated 
network effects, local network effects, broadband Internet, multiple-service, Sweden.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“Regulation is presumed to be designed to avoid (potential) market failures, usually because of firms’ 
market power, the consequence of which leads to a decrease in economic welfare. However, the cost 
of regulation may outweigh any effects policy makers have on the firm due to administrative costs, 
regulatory capture and other effects that have been addressed by others. . . .Thus, those distorting 
effects are equally as bad, or worse than, the market failure regulators hoped to ameliorate.” 
(Alleman & Rappoport, 2005) 
1.1 Background 
Telecommunications markets in many countries have been liberalized since the 1990s. Liberalization 
processes include licensing, establishment of telecom regulator, and market entry regulations. 
Licensing schemes, as well as, market entry regulations (e.g. interconnection and local loop 
unbundling) have been established to facilitate market competition. In addition, telecom regulatory 
authorities have been formed to reduce the conflicts of a government acting as both owner and 
regulator, meanwhile telecom state-owned companies have also been privatized (Bohlin, 1993) and 
private companies have been issued licenses to provide telecom services. As a result, several entrants 
have entered the markets. Market entry regulations also provide an opportunity to new entrants to 
either connect their own networks to the networks of incumbents, or lease these networks. Therefore, 
the telecom market is currently more competitive, and telecom tariffs, particularly for mobile service, 
have declined significantly in developed countries, when compared to the pre-liberalization period.  
Though liberalization has taken place, the telecom market remains somewhat different from other 
markets. Incumbent operators seem to have competitive advantages over new entrants. The telecom 
market shares important features as network industries. The main features consist of significant 
economies of scale in production, network effects, the need for compatibility and standards, and 
complementarities in demand and switching costs for consumers (Shy, 2001). Therefore, these 
features tend to favour incumbents and very often make competition, particularly entry, less 
competitive (Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). 
Network effects and switching costs are crucial factors for competition in a telecom market. It is 
obvious that network effects exist in this market (e.g. Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Shy, 2001; Farrell & 
Klemperer, 2007). The decisions of consumers in subscribing to telephony service depend on how 
many other people are also on the network (both mobile and fixed telephone networks). Then, 
telephone networks must be interconnected and the interconnection must be a compulsory condition in 
order to enhance the benefits of network effects. Otherwise, consumers would prefer to subscribe to 
the larger network rather than the smaller one, so as to be able to call a larger number of people. 
Therefore, larger networks will become even bigger and more attractive to future consumers, 
compared to smaller networks.  
Consumer switching costs are also important in this market. Changing from one telecom operator to 
another can potentially result in a less favourable situation for customers. Mobile subscribers can be 
confronted with high switching costs, and, in particular, with transaction costs. For example, they need 
to provide information about their new telephone number to their social network. Consequently, it is 
possible that certain customers will remain with their existing operator, even though they are not 
satisfied with it.  
In the mobile communications market, even though several mobile operators participate in the market 
and some necessary regulations, such as number portability and mandatory interconnection, have been 
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introduced due to the liberalization efforts of the 1990s, competition in mobile communications 
services remains limited. Only three or four major mobile network operators take most of market 
shares in a country (OECD, 2009, p. 59). This is of course due to technical barriers to entry – the 
scarcity of a spectrum or limited number of spectrum licenses. Furthermore, incumbent operators can 
utilize the main features of network industries by introducing strategic instruments that will raise 
switching costs and enhance the benefits of network effects to bind consumers to their networks 
(Valletti & Cave, 1998). These strategic instruments include: 
 SIM-card locking 
 Termination-based price discrimination 
 Multiple-standards 
 Differential coverage, and roaming 
 Calling clubs 
Mobile operators, for instance, introduce termination-based price discrimination to compete for 
subscribers. They set different per minute prices for different calls. Calls made within the same 
network (on-net) are cheaper than calls made via rival networks (off-net). On/off-net price 
differentiation will make on- and off-net calls incompatible, even though there is full interconnection 
(Grajek, 2010). This will prompt new customers to favour the larger mobile operators since most of 
their calls will make within the larger mobile operator (if new customers expect to have a balanced 
calling pattern). At the same time, it will limit incentive to switch mobile operator for consumers of 
larger mobile operator. In other words, this will lead to higher switching costs for these consumers, 
and will limit competition in the mobile communications market. 
In addition, telecom operators in several European countries, including Sweden, have multi-service 
provision. The operators can produce a number of complementary services and deliver them through 
the fixed network. Complementary services include fixed telephony, broadband Internet access, and 
pay TV. In Sweden, most of fixed telecom providers provide mobile telephony, as well as mobile 
broadband. Telecom operators recently put these services into a basket and sell it at a single price 
(known as a “bundled package”) and prices of bundles are generally cheaper (since telecom operators 
offer a discount) than buying them separately. This may indicate that telecom operators utilize special 
features in telecom market, such as compatibility and economies of scope, together with bundled 
strategy to attract customers, to create switching costs and maintain their market position.    
Telecom operators in Sweden not only provide various complementary services, but they also offer 
multi-service with broadband Internet access or substitution services in broadband Internet access in 
the market. They supply various broadband Internet technologies, both fixed broadband (FB) such as 
DSL, cable modem, fibre, and mobile broadband (MB). Importantly, comparable speed and prices of 
MB are crucial factors for significant growth in MB adoption. Some consumers consider using MB as 
their main broadband Internet access, instead of FB. Telecom operators may encourage their 
customers to migrate from FB to MB services within the same operators. Migration from FB to MB 
provides an opportunity for telecom operators to avoid FB regulations. At the same time, operators 
will not lose their customer base. As a result, multi-service provision in broadband Internet access by 
telecom operators will create consumer switching cost through their economies of scope. 
It is more likely that multi-service telecom providers could utilize strategic instruments in mobile 
telephony market and economies of scope to raise consumer switching costs. Hence, it is crucial to 
examine the impacts of, in particular, termination-based price discrimination and calling clubs on 
consumer switching costs in mobile communications service. Also, it is important to scrutinize the 
impacts of multi-service provision on switching costs from the perspective of the telecom regulator's 
point of view.   
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1.2 Purpose and research questions 
This dissertation aims to investigate the impacts of network effects, driven by termination-based price 
discrimination and calling clubs, and multi-service provision on consumer switching costs, in the 
Swedish telecommunications market. The main research question is:  
“What are the impacts of network effects and multi-service provision on consumer switching costs in 
the Swedish telecommunications market?” 
To answer this question, two sub-research questions are formulated. The first sub-research question 
investigates the possible impacts of termination-based price discrimination and calling clubs (through 
tariff-mediated network effects and local network effects, respectively) on consumer switching costs. 
Three studies are performed and investigated these impacts in the Swedish mobile communications 
market. The last sub-research question investigates the possible impacts of multi-service provision on 
consumer switching costs, both relating to broadband Internet access and other complimentary 
telecom services. Two studies conducted use the Swedish telecom market as case study (see Figure 1). 
All of the studies employ quantitative methods as the main method of analyses. However, different 
statistical methods are applied in order to answer different research questions in each paper. The sub-
research questions are developed as following: 
RQ1: What is the impact of termination-based price discrimination and calling clubs on consumer 
switching costs?  
In the Swedish mobile telephony market, mobile operators can utilize several strategic instruments 
(e.g. termination-based price discrimination, SIM-card locking, and calling clubs) without any 
restriction. It is crucial to examine the impacts of termination-based price discrimination on consumer 
switching costs through subscriber retention and subscribers’ decision. As mentioned, termination-
based price discrimination can potentially yield more benefit to the larger operators than to the smaller 
ones. This will impact on switching decisions of mobile subscribers as well as initial decisions to 
select mobile operators. In addition, the decision of a consumer to subscribe to a specific mobile 
operator could be influenced by his/her social network or calling clubs. In other words, a consumer 
may take his/her calling clubs into account when subscribing to a mobile operator. This is known as a 
local network effect. Then, it is also important to investigate the impact of calling clubs on 
subscribers’ decisions, as well as consumer switching costs caused by termination-based price 
discrimination.  
RQ2: What is the impact of multi-service provision on consumer switching costs? 
As mentioned, several telecom network operators in Sweden are multi-service providers in retail 
markets. They mostly offer complementary services, such as various options for broadband Internet 
connections. In addition, they own both fixed and mobile network infrastructure. They may utilize 
their resources and capabilities to raise consumer switching costs. Therefore, the last two studies are 
conducted to show the impacts of bundling and the existence of FB and MB substitution on consumer 
switching costs.  
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Figure 1The main components of the thesis 
Source: Author 
These two research questions are based on economic theory, which will be explained in Chapter 3. 
Similarly, the discussion on how RQ1 and RQ2 contribute to the main research question and also the 
reasons behind the five studies are described in Chapter 4.  A simplified overview is given in Figure 1. 
1.3 Scope and delimitation 
The thesis focus is limited to study on the impacts of network effects and multi-service providers on 
switching costs in the Swedish telecommunications market. The thesis investigates mobile telephony, 
broadband, and multiple services markets. However, there are several strategies that telecom operators 
can apply to create consumer switching costs. The strategies include hand-set subsidies and long-term 
contracts in mobile telephony, and executive rights and long-term contracts in providing broadband 
services in apartment buildings. Future research can take these issues into considerations. The 
different examinations have different purposes, and the periods of study in the different appended 
papers can vary.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. An industry overview is given in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 provides a 
review of the relevant literature and theoretical frameworks. Methodology is presented in Chapter 4. 
Summaries of the appended papers are given in Chapter 5. The analysis and discussion are provided in 
Chapter 6. The thesis ends with comments on future research in Chapter 7. 
1.5 Applied terminology and definitions 
Bundling  Telecom operators put more than one service into a package, 
which they sell at a single price. The prices of bundling packages 
are usually cheaper than buying the additional services 
separately. 
Calling clubs Based the phenomenon that individuals do not place their calls 
randomly across networks, but have a bias toward repeated 
Switching costs 
Termination-based 
price discrimination 
Calling clubs  
(Local network effects) 
Multi-service 
provision 
I: Mobile subscriber 
retention  
II: Attracting new 
mobile subscribers  
III: Paying less with 
local network effects  
IV: FB vs. MB 
substitution 
V: Multiple 
services 
RQs 
Papers 
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calling other members of their calling clubs (their friends) 
(Gabrielsen & Vagstad, 2008). 
Local network effects Local network effects refer to benefits that make a smaller group 
of adopters more valuable than an entire population of adopters. 
Calling club and termination-based price discrimination can be 
considered as sources of local network effects. 
Mobile communications market The market includes the provision of voice, SMS and data 
communications services. 
Mobile number portability Gives an opportunity to mobile subscribers to retain their mobile 
telephone number while changing mobile operator. 
Multi-service provision The ability of telecom operators who can offer several 
complementary services (i.e. fixed telephony, mobile telephony, 
broadband Internet, and pay TV services). They can also provide 
several broadband Internet access technologies (i.e. DSL, cable, 
fibre, and mobile broadband). 
Network effects Subscribers gain more benefit from an additional subscriber 
joining a network. For example, both mobile and fixed 
subscribers receive higher benefits if there is an additional 
mobile or fixed subscriber joining the communications services 
network. 
Switching costs Switching costs are all costs associated with switching from one 
provider to another. These costs occur even when the services are 
functionally identical, and can be measured in both monetary and 
psychological terms (Klemperer, 1995; Chen & Hitt, 2007). 
Tariff-mediated network effects This term, defined by Laffont et al. (1998), means that under 
price discrimination, consumers are charged different prices 
according to whether the call terminates on the same network or 
a rival network. Thus, positive (or negative) network effects exist 
if the access price embodies a markup (discount) relative to 
marginal cost. Intuitively, a network discriminates against or in 
favour of the rival network depending on where it finds it 
cheaper to terminate calls. 
Termination-based price discrimination Retail tariffs are applied at different rates for different calls. Calls 
made within the same mobile operator network are cheaper than 
calls made via rival mobile operator networks. 
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2. AN OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION IN THE SWEDISH 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET  
This chapter is divided into three sections according the telecom services that have been investigated 
in the thesis. The first section provides the progress of development in competition on the Swedish 
mobile communications market. In addition, it discusses how mobile operators utilize some of 
strategic instruments to compete and raise consumer switching costs.  This section also explains how 
the Swedish telecom regulator responds to those strategic instruments in order to reduce consumer 
switching costs in mobile communication market. The development in broadband Internet in Sweden 
is discussed in the following section, which contains information about broadband penetration, shares 
of broadband Internet technologies, and major market players and their market shares. Moreover, 
competitive strategies are also discussed in this section. The last section supplies the explanations of 
the current state of bundled services. That section contains the bundled penetration in Sweden and 
discusses how major telecom operators utilize their existing position and bundles to gain market 
recognition. 
2.1 Competition in mobile communications services 
This section explains the progress of competition in mobile communications market in Sweden, 
including the historical background of telecommunication liberalization and market structure. The 
development of mobile regulations is also discussed. The section ends with an explanation of mobile 
operators’ strategies, subscriber lock-in, and subscribers’ retention decisions and their determinants. 
2.1.1 Liberalization forces and market structure in the Swedish mobile communications market 
The telephone was first introduced in Sweden in 1877 with free competition and several firms, both 
private and state-owned companies starting to provide switched telephone calls (Bohlin, 1993). This 
indicates that there was rather intense competition between telephone players (Thorngren, 1990) and 
there was at first no legal monopoly in telecommunications services, including mobile 
communications services. Anyone could set up a network to provide services in competition with the 
dominant state-owned operator, Televerket (Gruber, 2005, p. 84).  
In the initial stage of providing mobile services, there were two mobile operators, Televerket and 
Comviq (whose current name is Tele2). The latter being a private company and entered into the 
market in 1981 (Thorngren, 1990). Comviq faced many difficulties in competing with Televerket 
since Televerket had complete control of the regulatory aspects pertaining to competition, including 
spectrum allocation and interconnection. For example, Televerket several times rejected Comviq’s 
applications for frequencies to supply digital mobile communications services (Lindmark, 1995, p.70). 
This created a conflict of interest as Televerket was both an operator and a regulator, and was using its 
dominant position and the role of rule-maker to distort its competitor’s ability to compete. Then, the 
process of liberalization began with a parliamentary decision in the early 1990s in order to resolve this 
conflict and provide a level playing field for all telecommunications service providers (Bohlin, 1993).  
In 1992, an independent regulatory body, the PTS, was finally entrusted with the responsibility for all 
telecommunications regulations, including spectrum allocation (Gruber, 2005, p. 86). The first 
Telecommunications Act was introduced in the following year. The aim of the Telecommunications 
Act was to establish the conditions for an open telecommunications market. The Act also contained 
special provisions such as an interconnection and numbering plan. Moreover, this Act entitled the 
regulator to issue licenses that contain special conditions and can set special rules for all operators 
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(KKV, 1997, p. 12). In addition, Televerket was transformed into a state commercial enterprise – Telia 
AB – in the same year. Telia, in fact, wanted to be a limited liability company in order to ‘compete on 
the international markets for the profitable large customers’ (Hultkrantz, 2002). Telia wanted to 
conduct ventures in mobile services and mobile data services, and construct fixed telecom network in 
other European countries (Bohlin, 1993).  
Moreover, a third mobile operator, Europolitan (later known as Vodafone, and now Telenor), obtained 
GSM licenses from the telecom regulator in 1992. This enabled Sweden to become the only country in 
the world with three competing GSM networks in the 900 MHz range, right from the start (Gruber, 
2005, p.86). Nevertheless, the Swedish telecom regulator made efforts to open the mobile 
communications market with new mobile communications technology.  
In December 2000, the PTS decided to issue four new licenses for the provision of network capacity 
for mobile communications services, based on UMTS technology. These licenses were allocated to 
Europolitan (now Telenor), Hi3G, Orange and Tele2 (PTS, 2001). Unfortunately, Orange later 
returned its license because of financial difficulties. Meanwhile, Telia cooperated with Tele2 in the 
combined company, SUL AB, where they shared the 3G license of Tele21 (PTS, 2006). Thus, there are 
currently four mobile network operators, Telia, Tele2, Telenor, and Hi3G. Three of these operators can 
offer 2G and 3G mobile communications services, while the new entrant, Hi3G, can only provide 3G 
services. 
The Swedish telecom regulator not only launched mobile licenses to new network providers, but also 
provided opportunities to small firms who were interested in becoming mobile communications 
service providers, in order to increase the level of competition in mobile market. On March 1999, the 
PTS submitted a proposal imposing an ‘obligation to provide network capacity’ to the Government 
through amendments to the Telecommunications Act. The proposal was amended and embodied in 
Section 23a of the Telecommunications Act. This provision entered into force on 1 May 2000 (PTS, 
2001). It allows service providers and mobile virtual network operators to lease the capacity of mobile 
network operators. The main aim is to encourage small enterprises who cannot afford the spectrum 
license to enter the market and also to raise the level of competition in this market. In addition, to 
ensure that mobile subscribers of any operator can be connected at any time and area, PTS proposed 
national roaming regulation2 at the end of December 1999 (PTS, 2001). Roaming allows subscribers 
to use another network when the ‘home’ network is not available (Hultkrantz, 2002). 
Thus, there are currently four mobile network operators3 and a number of virtual mobile operators in 
the Swedish mobile market. However, most of the mobile subscribers belong to four of these mobile 
network operators (see Figure 2). 
                                                     
1 Europolitan and Hi3G also formed a joint company to develop a UMTS network. 
2 It was embodied in an amendment to the Telecommunications Act as Section 23b and entered into force on 1 
July 2000 (PTS, 2001). 
3 (1) Telia, (2) Tele2 or Comviq in the past, (3) Telenor and (4) Hi3G or Tre as marketing brand. 
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Source: PTS (2011) 
Figure 2 Market share of mobile operators at mid- 2011 
2.1.2 Mobile communications regulations 
In this sub-section, all mobile communications regulations are discussed as ex-ante regulations. These 
regulations, dealing with interconnection and mobile number portability, were implemented by the 
telecom regulator. This sub-section also explains the reasons for introducing these regulations, as well 
as the current status of the regulations. 
(1) Interconnection regulation and cost-based orientation 
A key factor to stimulate competition in the telecom industry, including mobile telecommunication, is 
interconnection. The Swedish Telecommunications Act of 1993 states clearly that “telecom licensees 
who publicly operate telecom services have an obligation to include interconnection among their 
networks”. This means that all operators that are in the Swedish telecommunications market are 
currently supposed to conduct interconnections with each other. In this way, all subscribers can reach 
each other irrespective of which operator’s network the subscriber is connected to (PTS, 2003).  
Since mobile communication is two-way, mobile operators need both to have calls from other mobile 
networks terminate on their own network, and to terminate calls from their own network on other 
networks. Hence, the operators usually pay and charge so-called termination charges.  
In the initial stage of regulation, the Swedish telecom regulator used asymmetric regulation due to the 
1997 European Interconnection Directive and the Telecom Act, which focus on controlling only 
mobile operators who have a significant market power position (SMP). The regulator sets several 
obligations for SMP operators in order to ensure that the mobile market is open for new entrants. 
There are some necessary requirements such as non-discrimination, transparency, and accounting 
separation. The most important obligation is to set cost-oriented SMP interconnection charges to make 
sure that incumbents cannot set high interconnection charges to squeeze rivals’ retail prices. This 
allows new entrants to survive in the market. 
Telia was the only mobile operator with significant power in the interconnection market. Therefore, 
the telecom regulator requested the submission of a calculation basis from Telia in order to review 
Telia 
41,0% 
Tele2 
30,9% 
Telenor 
16,2% 
Hi3G 
9,3% 
MVNOs 
2,6% 
Market share of mobile operators at mid-2011 
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whether the undertaking’s interconnection charges were cost-oriented (PTS, 2003). The cost-oriented 
model at that time was a conventional rate-of-return regulation based on historical fully distributed 
costs (Hultkrantz, 2002). For example, the first review of the interconnection charge resulted in the 
telecom regulator, in May 1999, deciding that Telia should reduce its interconnection charges by 
approximately 20 per cent, from 2.75 kronor per minute daytime and 1.60 kronor per minute, and at 
other times, to an average price of 1.89 kronor per minute (PTS, 2001). After Telia’s reduction, Tele2 
and Vodafone (Europolitan) also reduced their interconnection charges by 20 per cent, although the 
demand to reduce charges only applied to Telia. Subsequently, all operators reduced their prices in 
relation to the customers by approximately 20 per cent. This led to cheaper mobile telephony for the 
consumer (PTS, 2001)4. 
The Swedish telecom regulator also designated Tele2 and Vodafone to be significant market power 
operators in February 2002, even though the market shares of these operators were lower than 25 per 
cent, 18.6 and 13.4 per cent, respectively (Hultkrantz, 2002). However, the County Administrative 
Court has provisionally suspended this decision. Thus, these two companies were not yet obliged to 
have cost-oriented interconnection charges, but were compelled to charge fair market prices (PTS, 
2003). 
The new European regulatory framework for electronic communication was adopted in 2002. Under 
the new framework, all operators are subject to price controls; however, only the early-established 
operators have an obligation to apply cost-oriented tariffs according to long-run incremental cost 
(LRIC). Others have an obligation to apply a fair and reasonable tariff. The PTS did not include 
specified tariffs in its SMP decisions. Therefore, the actual levels to be applied are left for the 
regulatory authority to decide (PTS, 2006). 
Hence, Sweden has changed wholesale and emergent retail regulation. Symmetric regulation has been 
implemented to replace asymmetric regulation in the Swedish mobile market. This means that every 
mobile operator has to be regulated in an equal manner. Even though symmetric regulation is applied, 
it does not mean that symmetric prices are set.  
(2)  Mobile number portability and mobile communications tariff information disclosure 
One of the major obstacles to competition in the mobile communications market is the lock-in of 
customers' telephone numbers (Gruber, 2005, p. 62). In the past, any mobile subscriber changing 
mobile communications services supplier also had to change his or her mobile telephone number. 
Mobile number portability (MNP) was established in order to overcome this obstacle. 
MNP means that mobile customers can move from one to another mobile operator while retaining the 
same mobile telephone number. MNP was introduced in Sweden on 1 September 2001. There are two 
primary objectives of MNP. The first is to reduce consumer switching costs, in particular for business 
subscribers which potentially lose revenues if they change their mobile telephone number. The second 
objective is to achieve increased competition in price and quality of mobile services among mobile 
network operators and service providers (PTS, 2003). However, there are indications that only five 
percent of mobile customers take advantage of mobile number portability while they change their 
mobile operator (SNPAC, 2008). 
                                                     
4 See more detail on the reviews of interconnection charges from PTS (2001).  
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A mobile operator usually provides a varied kind of price plan. It becomes a burden to the mobile 
subscribers to compare prices among mobile operators. The Swedish telecom regulator and the 
consumer agency realized the importance of search costs, one type of switching costs, for the mobile 
user. Consequently, a price information website (www.telepriskollen.se) was established in June 2005. 
This provides the tariff information for all telecommunications services. In particular, this website 
gives consumers price information for telecommunications service of every telecommunications 
operator. Subscribers can make personal calculation according to their own habits and needs. In 
addition, Telepriskollen also includes facts about lock-in and cancellation periods, as well as other 
important conditions (PTS, 2005). Enabling telecom users to easily compare the prices and conditions 
of services offered by each telecom operator will result in an increasing level of competition in the 
telecommunications services market. 
2.1.3 Strategies and competitive advantage of mobile operators in relation to subscribers’ 
switching costs 
This sub-section explains the mobile operators’ price and non-price strategies related to subscribers’ 
switching costs and the competitive advantage of mobile operators. In addition, the subscriber 
retention decisions and the determinants of retention will be explained. 
(1) SIM locking, handset subsidies, and long lock-in periods 
Mobile operators have different means of locking in and increasing switching costs for different types 
of mobile subscribers. Mobile network operators in Sweden use SIM locking for their pre-paid users. 
SIM locking in the Swedish context is utilized with subsidized mobile telephones. This means that a 
mobile subscriber purchases a pre-paid card with a subsidized mobile telephone. This telephone 
cannot be combined with a subscription with any other operator for a certain time period, often 12 
months. The telephone continues to be ‘operator-locked’ even after this period. In order to unlock the 
mobile telephone, the customer is forced to pay an unlocking fee (PTS, 2001). This creates high 
switching costs for the pre-paid mobile subscribers who may wish to switch to other operators.  
Post-paid subscribers receive a different offer from mobile operators, which is a handset subsidy. This 
means that a mobile subscriber gets a discount for buying a new handset. The handset is sold at a 
substantial discount as part of a subscription contract for a lengthy term (often 24 months). In Sweden, 
mobile operators do not simply give free mobile terminals to their new customers. They apply a 
monthly payment basis to a customer instead of full-amount payment when a customer wants to 
subscribe to their network. The mobile customer must agree to a certain subscription period in order to 
get such a discount. Even though the handset subsidy gives benefits to the mobile subscribers, due to 
substantial discounts, mobile subscribers have to pay for a longer time using the same mobile operator. 
These mobile operator strategies create a long lock-in period to mobile subscribers as well as high 
consumer switching costs. Nevertheless, mobile operators in Sweden offer these strategies to attract 
new customers and also retain their own customers without any restriction from the telecom regulator. 
(2) Subscribers’ retention and the determinants 
The price and non-price strategies of mobile operators are not the only way to induce mobile 
subscribers to remain with their current mobile operators. The mobile operators’ characteristics also 
play an important role in retaining the existing mobile subscribers. 
12 
Since 2002, the Swedish telecom regulator has conducted an annual survey of individual use of 
telecom services, including mobile communications services. According to the 2007 survey, customers 
who had changed mobile operators in the prior six months constituted 10%, with the remainder (90%) 
having had no experience of changing their service providers in the same period of time.  
The major reasons for continuing to use the current mobile operator are mixed between operators’ 
strategies and characteristics. The operator’s characteristics appear to be most important in the 
decision to remain with the current mobile operator. These include brand image, network coverage, 
and transparency of billing. However, the operators’ strategies, such as low on-net prices and handset 
subsidies, are also important to the subscribers’ retention decision. A further reason for remaining with 
the current operator is the recommendations of friends and acquaintances (see Table 1). 
According to the survey, the most important factor is the first-mover advantage. The mobile operators 
who established themselves in the market early on are often favourably perceived by subscribers. 
These operators can also improve the quality of services, i.e. network coverage and customer services 
over time. Hence, it is worth taking into account the operator characteristics when studying the 
subscriber’s retention decision. 
Table 1 Reasons for using the current mobile operators in 2007 
Reasons (%) 
  
Brand image 89 
Network coverage 74 
Readable and comprehensible phone bill 50 
Low rates for on-net calls 42 
Well-functioning customer service 42 
Recommended by friends or acquaintances 28 
Low prices in general 27 
Offer flat rates 25 
Same call price to all mobile operators 16 
Handset subsidy 14 
   Source: PTS (2008) 
(3) Termination-based price discrimination and mobile operators’ competitive advantage 
The common retail prices for mobile voice communications service in most countries, including 
Sweden, consist of (1) subscription fees, (2) connection fees, and (3) air charges.  
The subscription fee mostly applies to post-paid subscriptions. A fee is typically charged on a monthly 
basis for access to the mobile network. The charge may in some cases include a certain number of free 
minutes of airtime. Subscription charges are typically a component of a two-part tariff scheme together 
with calling charges, whereby a high (low) subscription charge is coupled with a low (high) calling 
charge. 
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Connection fees are used with various definitions5. In the Swedish context, a connection fee means a 
fee charged each time a mobile subscriber makes each call. The different mobile operators charge 
different connection fees (see Table 2). 
Air charges are usually based on a per-minute charge. The mobile operators in Sweden usually price 
calling charges based on the time of day, or peak and off-peak periods. The peak charges are usually 
more expensive than off-peak rates.  
Recently, calling charges based on termination of calls, or termination-based price discrimination, 
came into wide use by mobile operators in Sweden. The mobile operator fixes the tariffs for calls that 
terminate on a competing operator’s network (off-net calls) at a higher rate than the tariffs for calls 
that terminate on its own network (on-net calls).  
This price discrimination scheme was introduced in Sweden before Hi3G, the new entrant network 
provider, entered the market. Nevertheless, when Hi3G entered, it used this price discrimination more 
heavily than the others did. Its strategy involved charging zero per-minute prices for on-net calls and 5 
SEK for off-net calls. This proved successful since Hi3G developed a high growth rate of mobile 
customers6. Without a prohibition of termination-based price discrimination, all of the mobile 
operators have offered similar kinds of termination-based price plans for both post- and pre-paid 
customers since 2004. Table 1 shows an example of termination-based price discrimination in Sweden 
at the end of 2003 and 2008. 
Table 2 On-net and off-net prices of each mobile operator in 2003 and 2008 (SEK) 
  2003  2008 
Operator connection  
per minute on-
net 
per minute off - 
net  
connection 
fee 
per minute on-
net 
per minute off-
net 
  fee min max min max  min max min max min max 
Post-paid                         
Hi3G 0 0 0 2.5 2.5  0 0.69 0 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Tele2 0.4 0.99 5.5 2.5 5.5  0 0.69 0 0.39 0 0.69 
Telenor 0.4 3.63 4.95 3.63 4.95  0.79 0.79 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Telia 0.4 2.95 3.5 2.95 5.4  0 0.79 0 0.69 0.39 0.69 
Pre-paid                         
Hi3G  - -  -  -  -   0.69 0.69 0.69 1.99 0.69 1.99 
Tele2 0.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5  0.69 0.99 0 1.99 0.19 2.49 
Telenor 0.5 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75  0 0.79 0 1.99 0 1.99 
Telia 0.4 6 6 6 6   0.5 0.69 0 4.9 0.69 4.9 
Source: PTS Statistic Portal  
Although Hi3G used termination-based price discrimination heavily and showed a high rate of mobile 
customer growth in its initial stages, the company still suffers from this discrimination now that all of 
the mobile operators provide similar price plans. Hi3G customers averaged 61 percent outgoing calls 
in off-net traffic between 2003 and 2008, while Telia’s customers made only 23 percent off-net calls in 
the same period, as shown in Table 2. This suggests that larger networks can benefit more from 
                                                     
5 A connection fee can mean an up-front fee that is usually charged for connecting new subscribers to the 
network (Gruber, 2005, p. 195). 
6 At the end of 2003, Hi3G had 18,056 subscribers, and six months later it had about 111,166 subscribers. 
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utilizing their network for price discrimination. Without any intervention from the regulator, this can 
create a potential problem for small operators. As a result, smaller operators may have a deficit access 
charge and lose profits. 
Table 3 Off-net calls percentage for each mobile operator from 2003 to 2008 (%) 
Operator 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
       
Telia 23.73 16.99 25.63 23.73 25.26 26.21 
Tele2  44.54 46.02 18.84 24.35 25.37 24.94 
Telenor  49.81 53.85 55.20 57.69 52.21 52.29 
Hi3G  65.97 56.85 58.80 63.06 60.99 62.30 
Source: PTS Statistic Portal  
Hence, termination-based price discrimination offerings by incumbents or larger mobile operators 
provide a competitive advantage for themselves. Lower prices with larger numbers of subscribers 
could attract new mobile subscribers as well as retain existing ones. 
2.2 Development and competition on broadband Internet in Sweden  
Sweden has one of the highest percentages of household Internet access penetration, with 86% of the 
households, compared with 65% for the EU-27 countries. Moreover, 79% of household Internet 
connections in Sweden use broadband connection and 15% dial-up connection (Eurostat, 2009). High 
broadband Internet penetration results from a well-developed broadband infrastructure and market 
regulations.  
Several broadband strategies have been implemented since 1999 in order to build broadband network 
availability throughout Sweden. An information society for all was the first broadband strategy in 
Sweden, and was implemented in 1999. This national broadband strategy aimed to ensure that every 
household in Sweden had access to the Internet. Two main strategies were proposed. The first was to 
open up the network of Telia, an incumbent telecom operator, by implementing local loop unbundling 
(LLU). LLU allows new entrants to use the incumbent’s network to provide broadband services to 
end-users. Another strategy was to provide government funding to foster broadband infrastructure 
development in 2000-2005 (Eskelinen, Frank, & Hirvonen, 2008). This strategy included the 
development of FB infrastructure (cable and fibre access) through government funding. Funding was 
allocated to construct three different levels of broadband infrastructure including backbone networks, 
regional networks and local networks in the municipalities’ areas (Cullen International, 2002). These 
network infrastructures were built as a competing national backbone to the incumbent’s network. 
Several local communities, as well as private providers, offered their residents and businesses 
broadband services through municipal fibre networks as a market alternative (Shim, Lee & Yun, 
2006). Several broadband strategies and government policies have been implemented in 2000 – 2009. 
For example, the PTS launched the Proposal for Swedish Broadband Strategy 2007 – 2010 in 
February 2007. Its aim was to assure the entire Swedish population of Internet infrastructure allowing 
at least 2 Mbps downstream capacity, by 2010. The government continued public support for the 
rollout of broadband infrastructure. One of the conditions for this was that broadband networks funded 
by central government support would be open to other service providers during the lifetime of the 
networks (PTS, 2007b).  
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The national broadband strategies resulted in a well-established broadband infrastructure, especially 
fixed infrastructure, available for Internet broadband use, with 99% of households having access to 
DSL connection throughout Sweden. The coverage of the cable and fibre infrastructures is 32% and 
33% of the populated areas, respectively (PTS, 2010a). The speed of fixed broadband connection is in 
the range of 2-100 Mbit/s. More than 30% of households have a broadband connection with a speed 
exceeding 21 Mbit/s (PTS, 2010b). 
The Swedish government and telecom regulatory authority also pay attention to MB development. In 
2007, the Proposal for Swedish broadband strategy was proposed by the telecom regulator. One of 
key strategies in this proposal was to encourage mobile network providers to upgrade their Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) to High Speed Package Access (HSPA)7 in order to 
promote broadband access by means of wireless service. HSPA had 99% coverage of the populated 
area of Sweden by mid-2010. This upgrade could raise transmission rates both downstream and 
upstream. The MB subscriber could access broadband Internet service at speeds of 3.1-14.4 Mbit/s, 
which is comparable to a DSL connection. Consequently, FB subscribers gradually increased over 
time as the implementation of the first broadband strategy and the growth of FB flattened at the end of 
2010, and rapid growth of MB continues (see Figure 3). To be specific, 33%, 13% and 16% of 
broadband subscribers are connected via DSL, cable and LAN/Fibre, respectively; while MB has 
gained an increasing share from less than 1% of broadband subscribers at the end of 2006 to more than 
33% in mid-2010 (see Figure 4). This may indicate that mobile broadband may well become a 
common way for Swedes to access the Internet. 
 
Source: PTS Statistic Portal  
Note: *This is a summation of subscribers of DSL, cable, and fiber Internet connections 
Figure 3 FB and MB subscribers 
                                                     
7 HSPA is specified as permitting transmission rates downstream of 14 Mb per second and 1.9 Mb per second 
upstream (PTS, 2007a). 
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Source: PTS statistic portal 
Note: * at June 30, 2010 
Figure 4 Share of Internet connections 
The broadband market is currently divided between Telia (37.7%), Telenor (19.2%), Tele2 (12.2%), 
Com Hem (11.9%), Hi3G (6.5%) and several minor players, including private ISPs and municipalities 
(PTS, 2010a) (see Table 4). Telia is an incumbent in fixed telephony and mobile telephony. Its 
broadband services can be delivered over DSL, MB and fibre infrastructures. Telia has DSL 
infrastructure due to its network legacy of fixed telephony. Its fixed telephony infrastructure was 
upgraded to provide ADSL service since 2000. Telia accounted for 61% of DSL subscribers by the 
end of 2009. Telia has also upgraded its UMTS infrastructure, which is jointly owned with Tele28, and 
Telia now has the largest market share of MB subscribers with around 30.9% of the subscribers for the 
same period. Telia started to build networks with Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology or fourth 
generation (4G) MB in Sweden and Norway in 2009 and launched services commercially in 
Stockholm and Oslo at the end of that year (Telia, 2009). Telia has also been involved in several 
collaborative local municipal projects and has connected some buildings with fibre-LAN extensions in 
a few major cities since 2000 (Telia, 2000). The company currently has a 14.8% share of the fibre 
subscriptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Telia and Tele2 have formed a joint UMTS network company, SULAB, which now holds the original Tele2 
licence (PTS, 2006). 
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Table 4 Market players and their market shares at the end of 2009 
 
Market share 
 
Overall xDSL Cable Fibre MB 
Telia 37.7 61.0 
 
 14.8 30.9 
Telenor 19.2 24.9   27.6 26.0 
Tele2 12.2 6.9 4.9 6.3 19.1 
Com Hem 11.9 
 
90.2 0.1   
Hi3G 6.5 
 
  22.5 
Other 12.5 7.2 4.9  51.2  1.5 
Source: PTS statistics Portal  
Telenor is second in the broadband services market. It provides broadband services over three different 
technologies, which is similar to Telia. Telenor mainly operates DSL and MB services. It also owns a 
subsidiary, Bredbandsbolaget, which is very active in fibre Internet connection. By the end of 2009, 
Telenor and its subsidiary company had 24.9% of DSL, 27.6% of fibre and 26% of MB.  
Tele2 is the only broadband provider that delivers broadband services over four major technologies. 
Tele2 has the lowest market share of MB even though it is the second largest mobile operator in 
Sweden. In contrast, Hi3G entered the mobile market with UMTS technology in 2003, providing only 
MB service to the end-users, and it has 22.5% of the MB subscribers. One possible reason for Hi3G’s 
high MB market share is that two-thirds of Hi3G’s subscribers have connections of 10 Mbit/s or more 
whereas its major competitors, e.g. Telia and Tele2, have fewer subscribers connecting at those 
speeds. Nonetheless, Tele2 and Telenor formed a joint venture called Net4Mobility in 20099 with an 
aim of providing 4G services and rolling out nationwide coverage of a 4G network. This would give 
these broadband providers the opportunity to offer higher speed connection through a MB 
infrastructure.  
Another important player, Com Hem, an incumbent cable TV provider, provides broadband service 
mainly over a cable network. It has a 90.2% market share of cable modem connection. As mentioned, 
cable coverage is fairly limited and concentrated to more densely-populated areas. Cable is subject to 
indirect competition with other FB technologies as well as MB. Com Hem has its own arena, however, 
since it has signed contracts with several apartment owners in order to have an executive right to 
deliver broadband services to these apartment buildings10. 
In the Swedish broadband market, about a hundred small players provide broadband Internet services. 
Most of these are local municipalities and private companies. Municipal authorities have played a 
crucial role in providing alternative broadband Internet access through fibre networks to their residents 
and businesses. Municipal authorities are forced to open up their fibre networks to service providers 
by the central government. This boosts competition in the regional and local telecommunications 
markets. 
The FB and MB service providers are almost identical. For example, the incumbents of FB, Telia and 
Telenor, also offer MB technology. There are thus relatively few major players. Moreover, the current 
trend indicates that people are more likely to subscribe to MB services than FB services due to the 
                                                     
9 http://www.net4mobility.com/ 
10 The same strategy was applied by Bredbandsbolaget when it rolled out a fibre network to apartment buildings 
(Shim et al., 2006). 
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convergence of prices and comparable speed of connection. It is likely that incumbents in FB will use 
their market position to sustain their market shares. 
2.3 Current situation of bundled service in Sweden 
Technology advances in the telecom sector have resulted in higher efficiency of infrastructure 
utilization. Swedish telecom operators use IP-technology to deliver different types of telecom services, 
such as telephony, data communications, and media, through the same electronic pipe (PTS, 2007c). 
Telecom operators not only offer telecom services individually, but also provide a package of services 
and sell it at a single price for bundling services. 
There are at least two major reasons for telecom operators to offer bundled services to end consumers. 
Cost saving is one of the reasons. Telecom operators can share administrative costs, such as customer 
service, with other telecom services while offering bundling services. In addition, telecom operators 
can offer more services, as well as bundled services, without significant investment in infrastructure if 
they already have IP-based technology network. Another reason for offering bundling is that telecom 
operators can gain more revenue stream if they broaden their range of services from their core 
businesses (PTS, 2007c).  
Bundling has been on the Swedish telecom market for several years, but has become more noticeable 
in recent years (PTS, 2010c). Sweden demonstrated the biggest percentage point increase (22%) 
between 2006 (21%) and 2009 (43%). There is also evidence that most countries with a high rate of 
broadband Internet access, including Sweden, have a high rate of bundling (European Commission, 
2010). There are three groups of bundles: double play, triple play, and quadruple play. A double play 
is a combination of two telecom services, such as fixed telephone and fixed broadband access, or fixed 
broadband Internet access and cable TV service, etc. Triple play consists of three services including 
fixed telephony, fixed broadband Internet access, and cable TV service. Quadruple play means a triple 
play package plus mobile telephony (see Table 5). 
At the initial stage, the bundling was offered as double-play, and this has been the most popular of the 
bundling packages. Double-play accounts for almost 60% of bundled services. By mid-2010, more 
than 80% of double-play users had applied for fixed telephony combined with broadband Internet 
access. Recently, triple-play, in particular fixed telephony, broadband and TV service, has also played 
an important role in the bundling service. More than four hundred thousand households used this 
package in the same period. This resulted in more than 40% of the bundled services using triple-play. 
This contrasts with quadruple-play, which is not yet a popular service. Only five thousand households 
used that kind of service (see Table 5). 
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Table 5 Number of bundled purchasing by household and bundle penetration 
    
Unit: thousands 
Type of bundle  Jun 2008 
 Dec  
2008 
 Jun  
2009 
 Dec  
2009 
 Jun  
2010 
      Double-play: 336 440 478 610 702 
    Fixed telephony and broadband 254 340 370 496 593 
    Fixed telephony and television 13 16 18 20 21 
    Fixed telephony and mobile telephony        8 16 14 17 
    Television and broadband 68 74 70 76 71 
    Other combinations        2 4 4        
      
Triple-play: 235 299 405 442 483 
    Fixed telephony, broadband and television 203 252 357 394 447 
    Fixed telephony, broadband and mobile telephony 32 47 48 48 36 
      
Quadruple-play: 2 2 1 4 5 
    Fixed telephony, broadband, television and  
    mobile telephony 2 2 1 4 5 
      
Total  573 740 884 1 057 1 190 
      Bundle penetration    32%   43%   
Source: PTS Statistic Portal and EU Commission (2008, 2009) 
Several telecom operators provide different kinds of telecom services in this market. Not all 
telecommunications carriers provide bundled packages, however. The PTS reported that seven 
telecommunications providers offered bundled packages (see Table 6). Two of them provide all types 
of bundled packages. They are Bredbandsbolaget, or Telenor, and Telia. Tele2 and Com Hem supply 
double- and triple-play packages. AllTele, Bredband2, and Glocalnet only provide a double-play 
package. The rest do not offer bundled packages, but sell individual services, even though they 
provide more than one service (see Table 6). 
Table 6 Services offered by telecom operators 
Operator 
Core 
business 
Individual service Bundling 
Fixed 
telephony 
Fixed 
broadband 
Cable 
TV 
Mobile Double- 
play 
Triple- 
play 
Quadruple- 
play 
Bredbandsbolaget/Telenor Telecom        
Telia Telecom        
Tele2 Telecom       
 
Com Hem 
Cable 
TV    
 
  
 Glocalnet Telecom   
 
  
  AllTele Telecom   
  
 
  Bredband2 Telecom   
  
 
  Universal Telecom Telecom   
 
 
   ACN Telecom  
  
 
   Megaphone Telecom  
  
 
   Source: PTS Statistic Portal and company websites 
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Com Hem, Glocalnet, and Bredbandsbolaget launched bundled packages early on. Com Hem reported 
that one third of its broadband customers subscribed for bundles at the end of 2007 (PTS, 2007c). In 
addition, Com Hem offered its customers a combination of broadband, fixed telephony and television 
(PTS, 2007b). Bredbandsbolaget started its business by launching an alternative broadband access 
network in the form of fixed Ethernet to be connected to households and businesses, and is officially 
offering all kinds of bundled services in synergy with Telenor (PTS, 2000; 2006). 
Telia, as well as Tele2, began offering this service at a later stage. Telia used its market position in the 
fixed telephony service for broadband Internet service by requiring end-users to have a telephone 
subscription for the provision of a broadband access line. PTS ordered Telia to stop this practice, 
beginning in 2006, however (PTS, 2007b). Telia started offering digital television combined with 
broadband from the last quarter of 2006. At the same time, Tele2 also used its fixed network by 
supplying a double-play package, early on, and began to provide triple-play (PTS, 2007b).  
Table 7 displays individual prices for telecom services and a price for bundled packages. 
Unsurprisingly, it is cheaper to buy a bundled package than to buy the services separately. Com Hem 
offers a 47% reduction if the customer buys double-play, while Telia only offers a 5% discount. Telia 
gives the highest discount (26%) on the Triple-play package, compared with other bundled providers. 
Table 7 Price comparison between individual services and the bundling 
Operator 
2 individual services/ 
double-play 
3 individual services/ 
triple-play 
2 individual 
Services 
Double- 
play 
Saving 
(%) 
3 individual 
Services 
Triple- 
play 
Saving 
(%) 
Bredbandsbolaget 
(Telenor) 298 248 17 397 347 13 
Telia 358 339 5 457 339 26 
Tele2 269 199 26 368 287 22 
Com Hem 273 145 47 372 289 22 
Source: http://www.telepriskollen.se, company websites and compiled by the author 
Telecom providers who offer bundled packages can also sell individual telecom services separately 
with market recognition. It may be more profitable and efficient for the carrier side to supply bundled 
services, however, due to economies of scope. It may also be of more benefit to the consumer to buy 
telecom services as one-stop shopping and have the same bill for all telecom services with fewer 
payments than if buying them separately. The consumer will be more likely to buy additional telecom 
services from the same operator if he has had positive experience with that operator (PTS, 2007c). 
Nevertheless, service providers could also lock in their customers through their discounted bundled 
packages. Telecom operators usually required bundled services users to sign a long term contract, 12 – 
24 months. The bundled subscribers can receive a full discount on the bundle during that period. 
However, the discount will be reduced if the subscriber removes one of the services from the bundle. 
In addition, exchanging one service is often considered as switching subscriptions. This then results in 
the entire contract being terminated, and new fixed costs being charged the subscribers. This will 
remove the incentive for consumers to take out individual services from the bundle and also decrease 
any incentive to switch operators (PTS, 2010c). 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter discusses the main characteristics of telecom market in relation to competition in the 
market. The first section mainly discusses main characteristics of telecom market and how telecom 
operators can gain benefits by utilizing these main characteristics. The second section presents 
definition, role of switching costs, the impacts of switching costs toward competition in telecom 
markets. In addition, a discussion of bundling and switching costs is provided in this section. Roles of 
network effects, in particular tariff-mediated network effects and local network effects are presented in 
the last section. This relevant literature provides the crucial rationale why the telecom regulators as 
well as scholars need to pay great attentions on these issues. 
3.1 Main characteristics and competition in the telecom market 
Telecom services (fixed telephony, mobile telephony, and Internet) share the main characteristics of 
network industries. The markets for these services are unlike other markets, such as grain, dairy 
products, and apples (Shy, 2001). The main characteristics include:   
 Complementarity, compatibility and standards 
 Consumer externalities or network effects 
 Switching costs and lock-in 
 Significant economies of scale in production 
Telecom operators usually compete with ‘a dynamic competition’. A dynamic competition refers to 
the operators choosing other strategies other than pricing11 to differentiate themselves from their 
competitors. They focus to competing on quality, service packages, brand loyalty, location of delivery, 
long-term contracts, etc. (Bauer, 2003-as cited in Groenewegen, 2005). Mobile operators, for instance, 
apply handset subsidy associated with long-term contract to compete for customers and at the same 
time they can be used to raise consumer switching costs and lock-in existing customers. Moreover, 
incumbent mobile operators in the past intentionally refused to connect their networks with those of 
smaller mobile operators, in order to enhance their direct network effects and make networks of 
smaller operators inferior from the point of view of consumers. This indicates that incumbents utilize 
the advantages of the main features associated with various strategic instruments to limit competition12 
in mobile communication market (Gans, King, & Wright, 2005). The competition in the telecom 
market therefore fits well with the dynamic competition concept, because telecom operators can apply 
those strategies to reduce uncertainty in price reduction and loss of profit margin which resulted from 
entry regulations. 
                                                     
11 In static competition, new entrants came to the market with the homogenous product as incumbents. They 
compete on price as well as minimize production costs. In addition, the operators also compete by using 
transaction costs. If the firms fail to compete on those issues, they may not survive in the market (Groenewegen, 
2005). It should be noted that in telecom markets, new entrants come to produce the same services as incumbents 
while also minimizing production and transaction costs. However, telecom operators also compete in dynamic 
competition by introducing various strategies in order to make themselves superior to their competitors.  
12 Gans et al. (2005) state that there are two main causes to limit competition in wireless communications. The 
possibility of tacit collusion is the first reason. This may due to the historical market structure, which allowed 
only two networks to exist in the country. There is evident indicating that tacit collusion existed in the U.K., the 
U.S., and Germany in different periods of time.  The last cause is that incumbents can apply strategic instruments 
to limit competition in wireless communications market. 
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Others strategic instruments are applied by mobile operators as means to compete. These strategic 
instruments consist of a lack of number portability, incompatible standards, termination-based price 
discrimination (or network-based price discrimination), and differential coverage (Valletti & Cave, 
1998; Valletti, 1999, 2002). For instance, incumbent mobile operators usually oppose the 
implementation of number portability regulation. The classical argument they use is that number 
portability is costly. The operators cannot be able to fully pass on this cost to consumers who wish 
carry with them their numbers, resulting in higher costs to operators (Gans et al., 2005). In fact, 
incumbents gain benefits from a lack of number portability. Their customers will not switch to their 
competitors because, by so doing, they would lose their numbers, even though they would get better 
deals from competitors. This raises consumer switching costs and enables incumbents to retain their 
market shares, profits, and market power. However, it is less important in today’s competition because 
telecom regulators in most European countries13 have implemented number portability regulations on 
the market in order to reduce consumer switching costs (see detailed discussion on Section 3.2). The 
issue of incompatible standards of mobile communications is also less significant. Different mobile 
technologies, such as GSM and CDMA, are present in the same handset. Mobile subscribers do not 
need to purchase a new handset when changing mobile operators, as mobile operators provide different 
mobile standards. 
Termination-based price discrimination is currently a matter of great concern to industrial 
organizations economists, marketing researchers, and telecom regulators. Mobile operators in many 
countries set off-net prices higher than on-net prices. This has been investigated both in theoretical and 
empirical studies regarding the impact of price discrimination on competition in mobile markets, and 
their main conclusion is that termination-based price discrimination makes smaller networks less 
attractive (e.g. Berger, 2002; Hoernig, 2007; Gabrielsen & Vagstad, 2008; Kim & Kwon, 2003; Fu, 
2004). In addition, if this makes on- and off-net calls incompatible from the mobile subscriber's point 
of view, then mobile subscribers will less likely place calls on rivals’ network because off-net prices 
are expensive (Grajek, 2010). This demonstrates that mobile operators again apply the main features 
of network industries, such as network effects and incompatibility to raise consumer switching costs 
(for more detailed discussion, see Section 3.3).  
As mentioned, telecom operators now compete on product differentiation, and one of their product 
differentiation strategies is the implementation of bundled packages. It is convenient for consumers to 
buy more telecom services from the same operators, and it is beneficial to the consumers as they can 
receive a single bill as well as a significant price reduction when buying bundled packages. Moreover, 
buying several telecom services from a single provider will mean less concern about the compatibility 
among the services. In addition, it reduces transaction costs as well as compatibility costs of 
consumers and raises consumer benefit (e.g. Lee & Norsworthy, 1998). At the same time, bundling is 
also valuable for telecom operators as it can be utilized to raise consumer switching costs and win 
consumer loyalty (detail discussion is in Section 3.2.4). 
The nature of telecom market is dynamic and telecom technologies have changed relatively fast 
compared to other service markets, such as postal services. Telecom operators have invested in both 
fixed and wireless or mobile infrastructure to response to heterogeneous consumer demand and 
technological changes. In some countries, such as Sweden and Japan, most of telecom operators offer 
various kinds of broadband connections including fixed (DSL, cable, and FTTH) and mobile 
                                                     
13 UK and the Netherlands introduced MNP in 1999, while Sweden was the fifth European nation to do so since 
2001 (Buehler et al., 2006). 
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technologies. This development will lead to an FB and MB substitution situation. Consumers will 
switch from FB toward MB because both FB and MB offer similar speed of connection and prices, but 
MB has an advantage of mobility. However, switching among broadband technologies may occur just 
within the same operators because the customers may confront switching costs in broadband migration 
(Ida & Sakahira, 2008).  
In sum, telecom operators use different kinds of strategies (i.e. termination-based price discrimination, 
bundling, and multi-service provision in broadband) associated with main features in order to compete 
in this industry, to increase consumer switching costs and sustain the incumbent market position. 
3.2 Switching costs and their impacts on telecommunications 
3.2.1 Definition and causes of switching costs 
Switching costs are all costs associated with switching from one provider to another (Chen & Hitt, 
2007). These costs occur even when firms’ products are functionally identical (Klemperer, 1995). 
Switching costs are present in various products and services (e.g. Borenstein, 1991; Kim, Kliger, & 
Vale, 2003), and telecommunications, in particular, mobile telephony (e.g. Shy, 2002; Kim, Park, & 
Jeong, 2004; Lee, Kim, Lee, & Park, 2006; Grzybowski, 2008; Maicas, Polo, & Sese, 2009a). 
Klemperer (1995) reveals that switching costs, in general, include not only those costs that can be 
measured in monetary terms but also those with psychological aspects. Switching costs are categorized 
into compatibility, transaction, learning, uncertainty, contractual (or discount coupons), and search 
costs. The following explanation presents each type of switching costs regarding to telecom services. 
Compatibility costs arise when users switch standards. In the past, a mobile user could not switch from 
CDMA to GSM phones immediately because mobile phones were not made for both standards. These 
costs, however, are less important because mobile phones now work with any mobile standard.  
One example when discussing transaction costs in telecommunications market is ‘number portability’. 
Transaction costs occur when subscribers switching between operators cannot retain their numbers. It 
means that moving from the existing fixed or mobile operator to a rival would require a customer to 
change number. This is costly to subscribers, who must inform their colleagues and friends of the new 
number. It is more costly to business subscribers since they lose potential sales. Again, transaction 
costs seem to be less significant in the telecommunications industry since mobile or fixed line users 
can now leave their operator while keeping their same number through the number portability 
regulation. 
To change mobile operators, mobile users need to spend time learning how this works even though 
these operators provide identical functions. Of course, mobile customers may not need to learn how to 
make calls or send SMS and so on. But they may need to learn a new customer service telephone 
number for the new provider and/or how to pay a bill. Then, mobile users encounter learning costs.  
Telecommunications services are experience goods. Consumer uses the service to determine its 
quality, to decide whether to repurchase a brand, or try another brand of unknown quality (Farrell & 
Klemperer, 2007). Hence, uncertainty costs arise if a consumer is not sure whether or not a rival 
operator will provide an equivalent quality of service.   
Contractual costs can occur in single and multi-service markets. In specific service, a mobile customer 
is offered a discount related to mobile services (e.g. a lower per-minute price and a discounted 
handset). To receive these discounts, the customer must sign a long-term contract (e.g. 12 -24 months). 
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If the customer wants to break the contract, a contract termination fee is applied. Telecom operators 
can also apply similar conditions to bundled packages.  
In addition, search costs are another component of switching costs. Search costs are the costs of 
gathering information about characteristics of services and suppliers. These costs usually occur not 
only when a consumer makes an initial purchase of a product but also when a consumer wishes to 
change supplier. 
3.2.2 Impacts of switching costs on competition in telecommunications 
A series of theoretical studies by Klemperer (1987, 1989, 1995) have investigated markets with 
switching costs, and their impacts. The findings conclude that switching costs can raise average 
prices14, create deadweight losses, discourage entry, and reduce product variety available to 
consumers.  Switching costs can reduce competition, shift the nature of competition and, as noted by 
Klemperer (1995), make ex ante identical homogeneous products, heterogeneous ex post (as cite in 
Maicas, Polo, & Sese, 2009b). In vertically-related markets, when switching costs are high, an 
upstream operator will not enter a downstream market to directly compete for market shares in 
downstream market at first. But it will choose to integrate with a downstream operator in the second 
stage to extract all profits from captured customers in the downstream market instead (Valletti, 2000). 
Further, market players can choose to either raise or to lower switching costs in order to reduce 
inefficiency, to enhance market power, to deter new entries, or to extract returns from a new entrant 
(Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). In sum, switching costs are often seen to have significant negative 
impacts which dampen market competition through market power. 
Knittel (1997) constructs an empirical model to test for the presence of search and switching costs and 
their influence on price cost margins in the interstate long-distance rates in the US. His results 
illustrate that rates have failed to fall due to the importance of search and switching costs in the 
industry, even though AT&T was broken up vertically in 1984 into local providers and a long-distance 
provider, and entry was encouraged. In addition, he concludes that both search and switching costs 
have provided long-distance carriers with market power. Epling (2002) also studies competition in the 
long distance telephony market in the US. She finds there is significant heterogeneity in subscriber 
switching costs, and subscribers with high switching costs pay significantly higher prices. Viard 
(2007) examines the effects on switching costs in toll-free services market where firms could not price 
discriminate between new and existing users. One of main results shows that market prices are 
reduced in response to a decline of switching costs. 
In mobile communications services, Grzybowski (2008) uses a mixed logit model to estimate 
switching costs in mobile telephony in the UK. The results show that consumers of mobile services in 
the UK face significant switching costs, which vary according to network operators. A similar 
estimation of switching costs in Portuguese mobile communications market is done by Grzybowski 
and Pereira (2011). Their main findings show that switching costs are considerable and decrease 
                                                     
14 Switching costs can also intensify price competition or lower average prices if firms can price discriminate 
between old and new customers, ‘customer poaching’. Firms will set aggressive prices to attract their rivals’ 
customers and this will lead to lower prices for (all) customers. See Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) for a detailed 
discussion. However, there are some studies, such as Chen (1997) and Taylor (2003) that show that in markets 
with switching costs, firms charge higher prices than do their rivals to their old customers in period 2. Then, 
consumers with low switching costs switch firms and consumers are worse off overall (Farrell and Klemperer, 
2007, p. 1991).  
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product substitutability. They finally conclude that the reductions in switching costs would increase 
consumer surplus. 
Several empirical studies pay attention to roles of switching costs in customer retention, customer 
loyalty, and customer churn in mobile communications. Gerpott, Rams, and Schindler (2001), 
studying the German mobile cellular phone market, show that ‘phone number constancy’, ‘image of 
the competitor’, and ‘network quality’ are important factors to explain customer retention, loyalty, and 
satisfaction. Most importantly, a lack of number portability has strong effects on customer retention of 
mobile subscribers even where their loyalty or satisfaction is low. The efficient implementation of 
number portability will reduce switching costs and promote competition.  
Kim and Yoon (2004) examine determinants of subscriber churn and customer loyalty in the Korean 
mobile communications market. They find that the duration of subscription to a mobile operator has a 
negative impact on churn. This means that the longer a customer has subscribed with an operator, the 
more likely the subscriber will stay with that operator. It suggests that the existence of a "customer 
lock-in” due to switching costs. Kim, Park, and Jeong (2004) investigate the determinants of 
subscriber churn and customer loyalty, and the effects of customer satisfaction and switching barriers 
on customer loyalty in the same market. Their results show that mobile operators must focus more on 
service quality and offer customer-oriented services to heighten customer satisfaction and to promote 
customer loyalty. In addition, raising a switching barrier by building a long-term relationship with 
customers through a further investment in customer relationship management is also important to 
construct customer loyalty. The study by Aydin, Özer, and Arasil (2005) shows similar evidence for 
the Turkish mobile phone market that switching costs affect loyalty and has a moderator effect on both 
customer satisfaction and trust. Operators can raise consumer switching costs through an improvement 
of their quality of services and their relationship with customers. 
Few studies have investigated switching costs in other telecommunications services, Such as Internet 
services. Madden, Savage, and Coble-Neal (1999) and Ida and Sakahira (2008) are among these 
studies. Madden et al. (1999) develop a model relating to the probability of subscriber churn market to 
various service attributes and subscriber characteristics in the Australian ISP market. Their results 
illustrate that churn is more likely when subscriber has had an account with another ISP. This may 
indicate that subscribing with multiple ISPs leads to the lower switching costs for the subscriber. Ida 
and Sakahira (2008) are interested in the significance of developments in FTTH in Japan. Then they 
develop models to examine broadband migration (from DSL to FTTH) and lock-in effects in the 
Japanese high-speed Internet access services. They find that the previous customers of NTT’s DSL (a 
dominant player in DSL Internet services) migrate to NTT’s FTTH rather than the FTTH of other 
carriers. This suggests that switching costs in broadband migration exists. Broadband subscribers 
desire to move from an old to a newer broadband technology within the same telecom operators. 
In sum, switching costs can potentially reduce competition and raise prices of telecom services. It is 
empirically shown that telecom operators attempt to improve services quality and build a long-term 
relationship to win customer satisfaction as well as raise consumer switching costs. 
3.2.3 Number portability as an instrument to lower switching costs 
Telecom regulators implemented mobile number portability (MNP) as a policy to reduce switching 
costs and increase competition among providers (Buehler, Dewenter, & Haucap, 2006; Lee, Kim, Lee, 
& Park, 2006; Lyons, 2006; Maicas, Polo, & Sese, 2009b). MNP enables mobile phone users to keep 
their telephone numbers when changing network. In other words, MNP reduces transaction costs for 
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mobile subscribers. This means that there is no need for mobile subscribers to spend time, money, and 
effort to inform their social network of a new telephone number.  
Recently, several studies (e.g. Lee et al., 2006; Lyons, 2006; Shin, 2007; Shin & Kim, 2007; Shin & 
Kim, 2008; Maicas et al., 2009b) investigate the impacts of an implementation of MNP on switching 
costs in various countries. The common finding shows that MNP plays an important role in lowering 
switching costs. For instance, a study by Maicas et al. (2009a) reveals that customers who maintain 
their mobile phone number when switching providers (adopt MNP) have lower switching costs, 
compared with customers who do not maintain their number (do not adopt MNP).  
However, the magnitude of switching costs remains high even after MNP is in place. Lee et al. (2006) 
note that to reduce further switching costs, a fair evaluation of the quality and prices of mobile 
providers is needed to reduce the uncertainty costs associated with switching. Further, Lyons (2006) 
shows empirical evidence that in order to reduce switching costs, MNP should be processed in less 
than five days.  
Moreover, switching costs in mobile communications are also caused by SIM-card locking. Mobile 
operators usually ask mobile phone manufacturers to lock their handset so it can be used exclusively 
within their networks. This makes it is difficult to customers to switch. Users interested in changing 
their current operator have to invest in a new handset. Nakamura (2010) reveals that the SIM unlock 
policy would reduce switching costs in the Japanese mobile communications market. This study shows 
that at least 20% of consumers in the Japanese market would benefit from a SIM unlock policy even if 
standardization of platforms is postponed. 
3.2.4 Bundling and switching costs 
Incumbents and new entrant telecom operators in most countries provide multi-service, in particular, 
complementary telecom services. They offer fixed telephony, mobile telephony, and fixed broadband 
Internet access. Some providers even provide additional services, i.e. cable TV and/or mobile 
broadband Internet access. This results from the advances in telecom technology that enables telecom 
operators can be able to deliver sounds, pictures and data through the same electronic pipe (Crampes 
& Hollander, 2006). Today, telecom operators can provide individual services as well as bundled 
packages. Note that prices of bundles are generally cheaper (since telecom operators offer a discount) 
than the same telecom services bought separately. Therefore, telecom operators can utilize main 
features, such as complementarity, with significant discounts to compete with rivals and maintain their 
market positions as well as profits. 
Theoretical studies on impacts of bundling on competition and social welfare show inconclusive 
findings15. Several studies show that bundled strategies can improve social welfare. Providing bundles 
to consumers increase consumer surplus (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1999) by lowering consumer 
switching costs.  Bundled subscribers will reduce their shopping costs or search costs and they will 
gain benefits from receiving several services from a single service provider. At the same time, buying 
a bundled service also reduces customer transaction costs (Lee & Norsworthy, 1998) and learning 
costs in term of payment and contacting the back office, which is in contrast to the case of buying 
several services from different service providers. In addition, offering bundling could increase 
competitive pressure among firms who provide bundles (Maturates & Regibeau, 1992; Lee, 2009). 
This will lead to decreased prices and lower firms’ profit (Maturates & Regibeau, 1992; Anderson & 
                                                     
15 See nice literature survey on economic motivation for bundling from Le Blanc (2001).  
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Leruth, 1993; Crampes & Hollander, 2006; Reisinger, 2006; Thanassoulis, 2011). Firms can use 
bundled strategies to synergize their services and to save on administration costs (Salinger, 1995; 
Arlandis, 2008).  
Nonetheless, bundling can be a potential instrument to create social loss. Bundled strategy can be used 
as a barrier to entry (Whinston, 1990; Nalebuff, 2000, 2004; Choi & Stefanadis, 2001), entry 
deterrence (Carlton & Waldman, 2002), and as an entry foreclosure device (Whinston, 1990; Nalebuff, 
2004; Rey & Tirole, 2007). For example, a firm can use its market power over the services by 
bundling them together. This will be a burden to a new entrant to the market since the entrant may 
need to offer similar products and packages in order to compete with existing providers (Nalebuff, 
2004). Moreover, firms use bundling to reduce consumer heterogeneity (Stole, 2007; Crawford, 2008). 
Bundling reduces consumer choice, and consumers are then forced to self-select the bundle that they 
feel best meets their needs (Schmalensee, 1984). It then is easier for firm to extract consumer surplus 
from more homogeneous consumers (Armstrong, 1999) and firms will receive higher profit (McAfee, 
McMillan, & Whinston, 1989; Thanassoulis, 2004, 2007; Crawford, 2008).  
Importantly, firms can use bundling to increase consumer switching costs (Maturates & Regibeau, 
1992; Nalebuff, 2004), win consumer loyalty, as well as attract new customers (Henten & Godoe, 
2010), and maintain their own market position (Bughin & Mendonça, 2007; Lee, 2009). Bundled 
services can raise search costs (one type of switching costs) of consumers when switching to other 
providers. Consumers have to gather all of information about rival service providers to ensure that 
they will switch to a more beneficial provider. In addition, it is difficult for consumers to switch since 
telecom providers usually offer complex menus of telecom services (Papandrea, Stoeckl & Daly, 
2003).  
As bundling in itself does not create added value for consumers, a discount must be offered to 
motivate at least some consumers to buy the bundle (Stremerch & Tellis, 2002). The discount could be 
monetary (e.g.10% off) or non-monetary (e.g. one service free). These discounts can be offered either 
immediately on purchase or sometime after purchase (Agarwal & Frambach, 2003). However, 
consumers need to sign a long term-contact, normally 12-24 month, in order to get the discount offer. 
A long term-contract will lead to contractual costs for bundling subscribers. Firms can exploit the 
advantage of contractual cost with a bundle discount, to encourage customer loyalty. Economides 
(2010) called the difference between the price under the bundling condition and the à la carte price a 
“disloyalty penalty” for not accepting the bundle. In other words, some consumers are forced to buy 
the bundle even though they value one of its components at below production cost (Adams & Yellen, 
1976). Therefore, consumers may not prefer to patronize more than one firm due to high compatibility 
cost and contractual cost. 
Though bundling is likely to play a major role for the telecom industry in the future due to technology 
convergence, the impacts of bundling on switching cost and competitions are ambiguous. The survey 
of literature shows no clear conclusion about the impact of bundling on switching cost and 
competition.  For example, it depends on whether there is competition between bundles or competition 
between a bundle and independent service. In the case of competition between bundles, it seems that 
there will be less transaction costs but perhaps higher compatibility costs (Nalebuff, 2000; Hurkens, 
Joen & Menicucci, 2011; Thanassoulis, 2011).  Moreover, under the competition between bundles, 
firm realizes a lower profit than competition between independent services. For large bundles, an 
incumbent supplier can benefit from bundling, while its rival is hurt (Hurkens et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, most of studies on bundling and its impacts have been done by theoretical modelling. 
Therefore, empirical studies are needed to show the impacts in reality. 
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3.3 Network effects  
3.3.1 Definition  
Katz and Shapiro (1985) define network products as ‘products for which the utility that a user derives 
from consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good’. In 
addition, both current and expectations of future sales could simulate network effects (Farrell & 
Saloner, 1986). In sum, network effects mean that a utility a consumer derives from adopting or using 
a product (positively) depends on the current and future number of other consumers using the same 
product.  
Network effects seem to give a positive impact to the society since they give more benefit to 
consumers who consume the same goods or services. However, from a firm point of view, network 
effects would give even more benefit to larger networks than smaller networks due to the ‘positive 
feedback effect’ (Arthur, 1989, 1990). This term suggests that increasing network size makes a larger 
network much more attractive to new purchasers, and it makes services that permit access to that 
network much more valuable. Hence, consumers tend to purchase products or services from larger 
network due to a higher level of benefits from network effects, and firms with a large market share are 
able to obtain a higher level of profitability (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1994; 
Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). In an extreme case, network effects may create ‘winner-takes-all’ markets 
(Arthur, 1996). There will be a company who may have superior products or technologies and acts as 
a dominant player, forcing other firms to abandon the market due to lack of competitive advantage due 
to network effects (Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Liebowitz, 2002). 
Network effects are described in the literature (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1994; Church & Gandal, 1992) 
as either direct network effects or indirect network effects. Note that the distinction between direct and 
indirect network effects refers to the source of benefit to the participants in the network (Page & 
Lopatka, 1999).  
Direct network effects are present if the quality of a good is directly linked to the number of other 
consumers of the same good. This means that an individual’s utility function is not independent of 
another individual’s consumption choices. Instead, utility increases with the other individual’s 
presence on the same network (Birke, 2009). A telecommunications network is a typical example of 
direct network effects. The purchase of communications services (telephones, fax, Internet access) 
directly benefits existing communications subscribers, who now have an additional person with whom 
they may communicate, assuming that each subscriber may at some point wish to communicate with 
every other subscriber (Economides, 1996). 
Indirect network effects arise when products or services have complementary relations between goods. 
Many products have ‘consumption interdependence’ characteristics. There will be less value if 
consumers adopt these products in isolation. However, value will be generated when consumers 
consume products with other complementary products. Computer hardware and software is a good 
example in explaining indirect network effects. An adoption of computer hardware is only valuable if 
computer software is available. In addition, when demand for computer hardware increases, demand 
for compatible computer software is stimulated. At the same time, the number of application software 
programs available in the market will encourage demand for hardware. The recent example is the 
implementation of ‘Apple iPhone’ (a mobile phone terminal). Its mobile operating system and several 
thousands of mobile software applications could stimulate massive demand for iPhones in the coming 
years. 
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3.3.2 Direct network effects and telecommunications service diffusion 
Gruber and Verboven (2001) and Koski and Kretschmer (2005) study the role of standardization 
(which induces network effects) on mobile communication diffusion. Gruber and Verboven (2001) 
study the 1G mobile communications technology, while Koski and Kretschmer (2005) focus on the 2G 
mobile technology. They find that setting a single technological standard or standardization accelerates 
the diffusion of analogue technology (Gruber & Verboven, 2001) and also facilitates the diffusion in 
2G markets (Koski & Kretschmer, 2005). With standardization, mobile users gain benefits since their 
search and switching costs are reduced. This may suggest that network effects stimulate diffusion in 
mobile communications through a single technological standard. Madden, Coble-Neal, and Dalzell 
(2004) apply a dynamic model to examine the growth of global mobile telephony and the economic 
factors that affects growth. They find that more mobile installed base customers lead to more growth 
of mobile customers. This suggests that network effects are important in explaining the mobile 
network growth. Recently, studies of network effects in mobile communications services are also 
presented in a specific country. Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2007) and Grajek (2010) estimate 
network effects in Germany and Poland, respectively. Their results confirm that network effects play a 
significant role in the diffusion of mobile services.  
Network effects not only present an essential role in a particular generation of technology, but they 
also play roles in intergenerational technology. Liikanen, Stoneman, and Toivanen (2004) introduce an 
econometric model to analyse the effect of an old generation of mobile communications (1G) on the 
diffusion of 2G mobile technology during a transition period. They find that 1G can have a positive 
impact on the diffusion speed of 2G technology. However, 2G mobile technology will finally take 
over 1G due to substitution effects. This reveals that network effects are also present in an 
‘intergenerational’ situation, i.e. from 1G to 2G. Mobile subscribers to either 1G or 2G mobile 
technology could benefit from network effects since they can reach any mobile subscribers of 1G and 
2G. Bohlin, Gruber, and Kouroumpis (2010) conduct a similar investigation on intergenerational 
technology in mobile communications but they expand their study to third mobile generation (3G) 
technology. They show that diffusion of 1G technology boosts the adoption process of 2G networks 
(this is in line with Liikanen et al, 2004), but 2G adoption negatively affects adoption 3G technologies. 
However, network effects still exist as long as 2G subscribers could contact to 3G subscribers either 
by voice or data communications (i.e. SMS, MMS, and Internet access). A recent study by Grajek and 
Kretschmer (2009) confirms that different technological generations, fixed-line and mobile 
communications technologies, could induce network effects in term of usage. Subscribers of fixed and 
mobile communications could gain almost the same benefits.  
3.3.3 Tariff-mediated network effects, local network effects and switching costs 
The implementation of interconnection regulation in telecommunications market in the late-1990s 
seemed to enhance network effects to telephony subscribers. Both fixed-line subscribers and mobile 
subscribers are able to interconnect. However, the benefits of network effects, in particular for mobile 
subscribers, are reduced by the introduction of termination-based price discrimination. Termination-
based price discrimination means that an operator charges different prices for calls placed on its own 
network and rival networks. An operator usually charges a higher price for calls placed on rival 
networks (off-net calls) and a lower price for calls placed on its own network (on-net calls). 
Termination-based price discrimination induces network effects because it is convenient for mobile 
subscribers to choose the operator with the largest customer base as Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998) 
define as tariff-mediated network effects.  
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The investigations of impacts of tariff-mediated network effects have been done in both theoretical 
and empirical literature. In theoretical literature, for example, Berger (2002), Hoernig (2007; 2008), 
Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2008), and Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010) investigate the impacts of on-net 
and off-net price differentials. They find that setting higher off-net than on-net prices gives consumers 
an incentive to subscribe to the same network as friends and make individual subscribers more 
unwilling to switch supplier at a later stage. In addition, a large network charges significantly higher 
off-net prices and set a higher on-net and off-net differential to limit off-net calls of its customers in 
order to make the smaller network less attractive. Further, tariff-mediated network effects can make 
larger networks more attractive, place smaller networks at a competitive disadvantage, and are 
particularly damaging to long-run entry and competition and resulting in welfare losses (Harbord & 
Pagnozzi, 2010). 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted to examine the impacts of tariff-mediated network 
effects in mobile communications markets. The conclusions of previous studies indicate that 
consumers prefer the mobile phone network with a largest number of subscribers, and the largest 
networks will get a much larger share of new subscribers, compared to their smaller rivals when they 
use termination-based price discrimination (Kim & Kwon, 2003; Fu, 2004). Additionally, termination-
based price discrimination also impacts network traffic. Users of a large network spend most of their 
airtime within their own network, while customers who are part of a small network are forced to place 
calls on other networks. As noted before, on-net call prices are usually cheaper than off-net call prices. 
Therefore, mobile subscribers choose to select the larger operators rather than smaller providers so as 
to minimize their phone bills. Birke and Swann (2006) examine the role of network effects on the 
consumer’s choice of mobile phone operators in the UK. One of the main results is that the proportion 
of off-net calls falls as mobile operators charge a premium for off-net calls. Higher charges for off-net 
calls lead to lower (higher) amount off-net (on-net) calls being made by mobile subscribers. Gerpott 
(2008) examines the impacts of termination-based price discrimination in European mobile 
communications markets and concludes that this price discrimination increase barriers to switch for 
end customers. It also makes larger mobile operators superior over smaller ones. Recently, Grajek 
(2010) mentions that the discount for on-net calls can lower the level of compatibility of mobile 
networks, despite full interconnection of mobile network being applied. This implies that on-net call 
discounts could make mobile operators incompatible in the eyes of subscribers. Mobile subscribers 
may reluctant to make calls to other networks due to high off-net calls prices. Hence, the on-net 
discount will distort benefits of interconnection. 
Farrell and Klemperer (2007) note that network effects may be local. A smaller group of adopters is 
more valuable than an entire population of adopters. It will be more convenient for a mobile subscriber 
to be with the same mobile operator as his family members and friends since he will make calls to 
these people the most frequently.  
Several studies investigate the role of local network effects on mobile users’ choice. Studies by Birke 
and Swann (2006, 2010) examine the role of local network effects in the UK and some Asian 
countries. They find that an individual’s choice of mobile operator is heavily influenced by the choice 
made by household members and friends. These effects are far stronger than the effects of overall 
network size. Corrocher and Zirulia (2009) also investigate the role of local network effects in the 
Italian mobile market. This study relies on a survey of 193 Italian students and finds that consumers 
who are more interested in local network effects are more intense and aware users of mobile phone 
services. These consumers take account of local network effects when choosing mobile operators. 
Moreover, Maicas, Polo, and Sese (2009a) show that the probability that a customer selects a mobile 
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phone company increases with a number of members of her social network already subscribed to that 
operator. 
In sum, the previous literature concludes that tariff-mediated network effects and local network effects 
influence consumers’ choice. A consumer selects a mobile operator according to size of customer 
base, his family members, and friends to exploit benefits from network effects, such as cheaper prices 
and greater convenience. His choice of mobile operator has been made by coordinating between his 
social network members, and it will later be difficult to switch without consulting them to co-ordinate 
the benefits of switching. Hence, it indicates that both types of network effects may increase switching 
costs since a consumer will not be willing to switch as long as he can make cheaper calls. 
The summaries of related literature are presented in Table 8.  The literature is classified according to    
their main conclusions and research method. The main findings of both theoretical and empirical 
studies indicate that switching costs can potentially reduce consumer surplus and social welfare. The 
major causes of switching costs in mobile communications market come from lack of mobile number 
portability and termination-based price discrimination. In addition, telecom operators can induce 
consumer switching costs by implementing bundles. However, it is uncertain from empirical literature 
whether or not bundling can potentially increase consumer switching costs. Consumer switching costs 
can be reduced by buying bundles since it reduces transaction costs. At the same time, bundles 
significantly increase search costs because the customers need to gather a great deal of information 
about bundled packages, and telecom operators usually offer fairly complex menus. 
Theoretical and empirical literature indicates that network effects are one of crucial factors in telecom 
market. It is explicitly seen from prior studies that larger mobile operators can gain significant benefits 
by utilizing tariff-mediated network effects and local network effects.  
Table 8 Summary of relevant literature 
Author(s) Main conclusion 
Research 
method  
Telecom 
services 
Switching costs and their impacts on telecommunications  
Klemperer (1987, 1989, 1995) 
and Valletti (2000) 
Switching costs have significant negative 
impacts, which dampen market 
competition through market power. 
Theoretical In general 
Knittel (1997) and Epling (2002) Subscribers with high switching costs pay 
significantly higher prices. 
Empirical  Interstate 
long distance 
telephony 
Gerpott et al. (2001), Kim et al. 
(2004), Kim and Yoon (2004)   
and Özer and Arasil (2005) 
Operators could raise consumer switching 
costs through an improvement of their 
quality of services and relationship with 
customers. 
Empirical Mobile 
telephony 
Grzybowski (2008) and 
Grzybowski and Pereira (2011) 
Switching costs are large and decrease 
product substitutability in mobile market 
Empirical Mobile 
telephony 
Madden, Savage, and Coble-Neal 
(1999)  
Churning is more likely when subscriber 
has had an account with another ISP 
Empirical Internet 
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Author(s) Main conclusion 
Research 
method  
Telecom 
services 
Ida and Sakahira (2008) Switching costs in broadband migration 
exists. Broadband subscribers desire to 
move from an old to newer broadband 
technology within the same carriers. 
Empirical Internet 
Number portability as an instrument to lower switching costs  
Lee et al.(2006), Lyons (2006), 
Shin (2006) Shin and  Kim 
(2007, 2008), Maicas et al. 
(2009) 
MNP plays an important role in lowering 
switching costs 
Empirical Mobile 
telephony 
Nakamura (2010) SIM unlock policy could reduce 
switching costs 
Empirical Mobile 
telephony 
Bundling and switching costs  
McAfee et al. (1989) and 
Thanassoulis (2004, 2007) 
Firms will receive higher profit when 
offer bundle 
Theoretical In general 
Whinston (1990), Nalebuff  
(2000, 2004), Choi and 
Stefanadis, 2001), Carlton and 
Waldman (2002), and Rey and 
Tirole (2007) 
Bundled strategy can be used as barrier to 
entry, entry deterrence, and an entry 
foreclosure device. 
Theoretical In general 
Maturates and Regibeau (1992) 
and Nalebuff (2004) 
Telecom operators  use  bundling strategy 
in order to create switching costs 
Theoretical In general 
Maturates and Regibeau (1992), 
Anderson and Leruth (1993), 
Crampes and Hollander (2006), 
Reisinger (2006), Lee (2009), and 
Thanassoulis (2011) 
Offering bundling could increase a 
competitive pressure among firms who 
provide bundles, and it leads to declining 
prices and lower profit for firms 
Theoretical, 
Empirical 
In general, 
Telecom 
Salinger (1995) and Arlandis 
(2008) 
Bundling can be used to synergize firms’ 
services and save administrative costs. 
Bundling also create economies of scope. 
Theoretical In general 
Lee and Norsworthy (1998) Bundling can reduce the transaction costs 
to consumer 
Theoretical, 
Empirical 
In general, 
Telecom 
Armstrong (1999) and Stole 
(2007) 
Firms use bundling to reduce consumer 
heterogeneity. It then is easier for the firm 
to extract consumer surplus from more 
homogenise consumers  
Theoretical In general 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) Bundling will increase consumer surplus 
since it increases competition among 
firms 
Theoretical Internet 
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Author(s) Main conclusion 
Research 
method  
Telecom 
services 
Papandrea, Stoeckl and  Daly 
(2003) 
Bundling services could raise search costs 
of consumers who want to switch to other 
providers 
Empirical  Telecom 
Bughin and Mendonça (2007) 
and Lee (2009) 
Telecom operators can use bundling 
strategy to maintain their market position 
Theoretical Telecom 
Crawford (2008) Bundling yields a heterogeneity reduction 
and increases firm profit 
Empirical Cable TV 
Economides (2010) Firms can exploit the advantage of 
contract cost with a bundle discount to 
encourage customer loyalty 
Theoretical In general 
Henten and Godoe (2010) Firms can use bundling to win consumer 
loyalty as well as attract new customers 
Empirical Telecom 
Network effects: Definition and literature 
Farrell and Saloner, (1985), Katz 
and Shapiro (1985, 1994), Arthur 
(1989, 1990) and  Farrell and 
Klemperer ( 2007) 
Consumers favour to buy products or 
services from larger network due to more 
benefit from network effects and firms 
with a high market share are able to 
obtain a higher level of profitability 
Theoretical In general 
Economides (1996) A purchase of communications services 
directly benefits existing communications 
subscribers, who now have an additional 
person with whom they may 
communicate 
Theoretical In general 
Direct network effects and telecommunications services diffusion 
Gruber and Verboven (2001) and 
Koski and Kretschmer (2005) 
Network effects stimulate diffusion in 
mobile communications through a benefit 
of a single technological standard 
Empirical Mobile 
telephony 
Madden, Coble-Neal, and Dalzell 
(2004), Doganoglu and 
Grzybowski (2007) and Grajek 
(2010) 
Network effects play a significant role in 
the diffusion of mobile services 
Empirical Mobile 
telephony 
Liikanen, Stoneman, and 
Toivanen (2004) and Bohlin, 
Gruber, and Kouroumpis (2010) 
Network effects play roles in 
intergenerational technology  
Empirical Mobile 
telephony 
Grajek and Kretschmer (2009) Different technological generations, fixed 
line and mobile communications 
technologies, could induce network 
effects in term of usage. 
Empirical Fixed and 
mobile 
telephony 
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Author(s) Main conclusion 
Research 
method  
Telecom 
services 
Tariff-mediated network effects, local network effects and switching costs 
Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998) Termination-based price discrimination 
induces network effects because it is 
convenient for users to adopt the operator 
with the largest customer base 
Theoretical In general 
Hoernig (2007) and Gabrielsen 
and Vagstad (2008) 
Setting higher off-net than on-net prices 
give consumers an incentive to locate on 
the same network as friends. Large 
networks charge significantly higher off-
net prices in order to make smaller 
network less attractive. 
Theoretical Mobile 
telephony 
Kim and Kwon (2003), Fu 
(2004), Birke and Swann (2006) , 
Gerpott (2008), and Grajek 
(2010) 
Consumers prefer mobile phone networks 
with larger number of subscribers and the 
larger networks will attract a much larger 
share of new subscribers compared to 
smaller rivals, when they use termination-
based price discrimination 
Empirical Mobile 
telephony 
Birke and Swann (2006, 2010), 
Corrocher and Zirulia (2009) and 
Maicas, Polo and Sese (2009a) 
An individual choice of mobile operator 
is heavily influenced by the choice made 
by household members and friends who 
communicate with each other 
Empirical Mobile 
telephony 
Source: Author 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the flow of study and data collection. It explains the rationale of five appended 
papers and the compilation thesis in Section 4.1. Data collections as well as statistical methods are 
provided in Section 4.2. A discussion on creditability, reliability, and representative of samples are 
also given.  
4.1 The evolving research questions throughout the studies 
The initial idea of the thesis was developed from a specific instrument in the mobile communications 
market known as termination-based price discrimination. Several studies (e.g. Kim & Kwon, 2003; Fu, 
2004; Grajek, 2010) have shown that consumers prefer mobile phone networks with a greater number 
of subscribers and the larger networks will get a much larger share of new subscribers than their 
smaller rivals when they use termination-based price discrimination. Hence, the first study is 
conducted, but the main purpose is different from the prior studies. The main aim of the study was to 
examine the determining factors, including termination-based price discrimination, that prompts 
mobile subscribers to remain with their current mobile operators in Sweden, since mobile penetration 
at the end of 2007 was 111% (ITU, 2007). There is also a possibility for mobile operators to use 
several strategies to compete in retaining their own customers because most of potential customers 
have been captured by mobile operators. 
The first study pays attention on the decision to switch or remain with a mobile operator, made at a 
specific point in time. The second study is introduced to fill in the gap of the first study. The study has 
a dynamics perspective and the decision of subscribing to mobile operators by different consumers is 
made at different times. The second study aims to examine the impacts of termination-based price 
discrimination, tariff-mediated network effects, on-net call prices, and the size of networks on 
subscriber attraction in the Swedish mobile communications market. The period of analysis starts from 
2003 and continues to 2009 (the latest data that can be obtained) because mobile operators started to 
introduce termination-based price discrimination in 2003.  The main hypothesis is that larger mobile 
operators will be able to attract more mobile subscribers than will the smaller ones. The major reason 
is that mobile subscribers will take the benefits of termination-based price discrimination into 
consideration when subscribing to a specific mobile operator. 
There are many factors that prompt consumers to subscribe to mobile services. The third study of this 
thesis was conducted in order to identify the determinant factors for subscribing to mobile services. 
This study, in fact, aims to support the conclusions of the two prior studies to the effect that consumers 
will not take only price and/or service quality into account when making the decision to subscribe to, 
remain with or switch from mobile operators, but they also take their social network (family members, 
friends, and colleagues) into account. Most subscribers will make most of their calls to members of 
their social network or calling clubs. Hence, subscribing to the same network as their social network 
can make mobile subscriptions more convenient because it then becomes easier connect to subscribers 
in the same network from a technical perspective. Mobile traffic can go through a single network 
rather than across networks. It is even more beneficial for mobile subscribers if mobile operators apply 
termination-based price discrimination, so that mobile subscribers can make cheaper calls. Farrell and 
Klemperer (2007) define this situation as local network effects. It is a subset of direct network effects. 
Certain groups of the population matter more than the whole population. However, local network 
effects in this thesis are defined as the benefit a mobile subscriber gains from being in the same 
network with their social network, and the benefit mobile subscribers obtain from termination-based 
price discrimination. Importantly, the study aims to identify individual characteristics that affect the 
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importance consumers attach to local network effects, and examine whether network-effects-oriented 
users pay lower monthly bills than other users, as they are typically more aware users. 
The three studies focus on the possible roles of termination-based price discrimination and calling 
clubs which mobile operators can use them to raise consumer switching costs and increase their level 
of attractiveness in the Swedish mobile communications market. Mobile operators, in fact, can use 
other strategic instruments in this market, such as handset subsidies and differential network coverage, 
to increase consumer switching costs. One may apply similar models to investigate the roles of those 
two strategies in relation to consumer switching costs. This will give a complete picture analyzing 
competition in the mobile communications market. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of the thesis, 
which is limited to investigating the roles of termination-based price discrimination and calling clubs 
to enhance network effects (both tariff-mediated network effects and local network effects) and 
thereby increase consumer switching costs. 
 
Figure 5 Flow of study 
Note:   The idea is driven by termination-based price discrimination 
   The idea is driven by calling clubs 
Source: Author 
The focus of the thesis has been shifted to investigating consumer switching costs for other telecom 
services (i.e. broadband Internet services and other complementary services, fixed telephony and pay 
TV.) It is actually driven by the fact that major telecom operators in Sweden provide several 
Thesis  
Mobile services 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
Termination-based  
price discrimination 
Paper I:  
Retention 
Paper II:  
Attraction 
Paper III:  
Paying less 
Calling Clubs Paper III:  
Paying less 
Multi-broadband service 
Provision 
Paper IV:  
FB vs. MB 
Broadband and other telecom services 
Multi- service Provision Paper V:  
Multiple services 
Complementary or Substitution services 
Complementary services 
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broadband Internet technologies and also various complementary telecom services. Telecom operators 
may use these characteristics to gain subscriber recognition and switching costs. Hence, two studies 
have been implemented in order to gain some insights on multi-service provision and consumer 
switching costs. 
The fourth study of this thesis deals with the issue of complementarity and substitution between FB 
and MB. Sweden is one of the countries where has a well-developed infrastructure and a high rate of 
adoption for both FB and MB. The advanced development of MB in Sweden gives an opportunity to 
MB subscribers to connect to Internet at a comparable speed and at comparable prices to FB. Some of 
people may consider MB as a substitute service to FB, as MB has a mobility feature, but some people 
may use both FB and MB as complementary services. Hence, this study has been conducted to 
examine the current situation of FB and MB complementarity and substitution in Sweden from 
consumer perspective. Own- and cross-price elasticities are provided in order to show the stage of 
substitution or complementarity. The findings of this study are crucial to the telecom regulators in 
revising the broadband Internet market definition. In addition, a comprehensive discussion on multi-
service broadband provision and switching costs is supplied to give insight to telecom regulators, as 
incumbents may use this situation to encourage their existing subscribers to migrate from FB to MB 
(within the same operators) to avoid a the high level of regulation of FB. 
As described, major telecom operators in Sweden offer various complementary telecom services. They 
do not only sell these services separately to the end users, but also sell them as bundled packages. The 
customers can either buy several individual telecom services from the same (or several) telecom 
operators, or purchase these bundled packages. This is called multiple services.  However, the 
bundling can be seen as a subset of multiple services and it is a combined package offering more than 
one telecom service from the same service provider and sold at a single price. Prices of bundles are 
generally cheaper (since telecom operators offer a discount) than the same telecom services are bought 
separately.  
The bundling strategy can be beneficial to customers, as well as telecom operators. The customers will 
receive the complementary services with fully compatible among services because all services (in the 
packages) are provided by the same operator, and they will also receive the cheaper prices due to the 
discount on bundled packages. In addition, customers will benefit from receiving a single bill and 
dealing with a single back office. In other words, buying a bundled service package also reduces 
consumer transaction cost and learning costs. At the same time, telecom operators can apply bundled 
strategy to lock in existing customers and attract new ones. For instance, bundles can raise search costs 
of existing customers. Switching from a bundled package would require the customer to gather all of 
information about rival service providers to ensure the switch will be beneficial for the customer. In 
addition, it is difficult for consumers to switch since telecom providers usually offer complex menus 
of bundled packages.  
Moreover, a significant increase in adoption of bundled packages has been observed in Sweden in the 
recent years. Bundled penetration in this country increased from 21% to 43% in the course of three 
years (2006 to 2009). This may indicate that bundled offers are an important factor for customer’s 
choices in adopting more telecom services. Therefore, the last study of this thesis takes place and aims 
to examine the determinant factors of buying multiple services from the same telecom operators in 
Sweden. The bundled services are included in multiple services and are taken into account regardless 
of specific combinations. Discounts, telecom operators, and socio-economic variables are taken into 
account in the analysis. The findings provide insights for telecom regulators in reviewing competition 
in telecom markets and regarding market definitions for bundled services. 
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The five research papers are expected to give some insights regarding competition in the Swedish 
telecom market in relation to consumer switching costs. Telecom operators do not use only the issues 
of network effects and switching costs to compete, but can also use some other strategies, such as 
handset subsidies, differential coverage, long-term contracts with apartment owners, and so on, to 
increase consumer switching costs and gain greater competitive advantages. It is, therefore, important 
to continuously investigate and examine competition in this market in order to ensure that consumers 
will obtain desirable consumer surplus. 
4.2 Data collection 
To be able to analyze the problems arising the thesis research questions, reliable data is crucial. This 
thesis utilizes various sources of data (see Table 10) in order to answer the different purposes of the 
papers. However, data from Post- och telestyrelsen (PTS), the Swedish telecom regulator, is the main 
source of data in most of studies.  
Three out of five appended papers (Paper I, IV, and V) use the PTS annual survey of individuals. The 
PTS started to conduct the nationwide survey of individual in use of telecom services in 2002. The 
survey is performed annually by postal mail during August and September of each year. It consists of 
several questions related to all kind of communications services and television in order to gain 
knowledge of the market from the consumer perspective. The questionnaire is distributed to about 
4,000 individuals, between 16 to 75 years old, randomly selected throughout the country. The response 
rate is quite high. In the 2009 survey, for example, it reached 53%. The survey data is publicly 
available upon official request. 
Paper III uses data obtained from the author's survey in 2011. The survey was conducted in order to 
examine the role of local network effects. To the answer main research questions of the paper, that 
author’s own survey of individuals was needed since data could not be obtained from the PTS survey. 
Hence, a self-administered online survey was performed In February and March 2011. That study 
focused on a sample of mobile consumers in Sweden. The questionnaires were distributed to members 
of online communities living in every part of the country. A total of 727 completed questionnaires 
were received, which represented a response rate of 36.35% from a sample of 2000. 
The data collected from the PTS survey, as well as the author's own survey, is well representative of 
the Swedish population (see Table 9), even though there is an over-representation of males in the 
author's own survey in 2011. This means that the results produced from these data sources, are 
credible and reliable as representing the behaviour of Swedish mobile subscribers. In addition, if 
another person analyzes the same issues and employs the same data and assumptions, he or she will be 
able to obtain the same results. In other words, these studies can be replicated.  
Table 9 Representativeness of the survey 
Characteristics 
PTS survey 
2007 
PTS survey 
2009 
Own survey 
2011 
Swedish National 
Statistics 
Age (head of household - mean) 45.08 48.65 44.65 44.00 
Education: college and university 31.69% 37% 47.47% 32% 
Gender: male 46.47% 53% 76.20% 49.77% 
Household size (mean) 2.45 2.5 2.32 2.1 
Housing: having own house N/A 55% 45.56% 50.87% 
Source: PTS Survey (2007, 2009), own survey (2011), and Statistics Sweden (2009) 
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Moreover, data from the PTS statistics portal are also utilized in Paper II. PTS collects the market data 
from all telecom services provided by telecom operators. This data are also publicly available via PTS 
website16. Data collection from the official website of the telecom regulator will provide data 
credibility and reliability. Hence, the results produced from this source of data are reliable. Further, 
one can replicate the study by employing the same data set and assumptions and be able to obtain the 
same findings.  
The studies apply different statistical analyses in order to answer different objectives of studies (see 
Table 10). For example, paper I employ a logit regression model which relates the decision of mobile 
subscribers ‘to remain’ or ‘to switch’ mobile operators with some service attributes and socio-
economic factors. However, details of the statistical methods are provided in each appended paper.  
Table 10 Data sources and methods 
Paper 
Data source 
Statistical Method PTS 
Statistics 
Portal 
PTS 
survey Others 
I: The determination of 
mobile subscriber 
retention in Sweden 
- 2007 - Logit regression model 
II: Termination-based 
price discrimination and 
mobile subscriber 
attraction in Sweden 
2003 - 2009 - Telepriskoll
en (2003 - 
2009) 
Dynamic panel data regression model 
III: Paying less with local 
network effects: An 
empirical analysis of the 
Swedish mobile 
communications market 
- - Own survey 
(2011) 
Factor analysis, cluster analysis, logit 
regression model, and OLS regression 
model 
IV: Fixed and mobile 
broadband substitution in 
Sweden 
Broadband 
coverage and 
availability 
(2009) 
2009 Broadband 
providers 
Nested logit model 
V: An empirical analysis 
of multiple services and 
choice of consumers in the 
Swedish telecom market 
- 2009 - Generalize Poisson regression model 
Source: Author  
                                                     
16 www.statistik.pts.se 
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5. SUMMARY OF APPENDED PAPERS 
This thesis is based on five papers, which are appended in full at the end of this work. This chapter 
briefly presents the main findings. 
The five papers are categorized into two groups of studies. The first group is related to switching 
costs, tariff-mediated network effects, and local network effects in the mobile communications market. 
In this group, three research papers have been conducted. One of the key findings of this group is that 
consumers of larger mobile operators face higher switching costs than consumers of smaller operators. 
Termination-based price discrimination plays an important role in locking in existing mobile 
subscribers in Sweden. In other words, termination-based price strategies can enable larger operators 
to gain a competitive advantage. In addition, they can be used in competing for new mobile 
subscribers. The last study of this group was conducted to demonstrate that mobile users do not only 
take the size of a network into account when subscribing with a mobile operator, but they also 
consider social networks. The findings confirm that there is the so-call network-effects-oriented group 
exists in mobile subscribers’ population. Members of this group consider tariff-mediated network 
effects, as well as local network effects, when they apply to a mobile operator. 
The last two studies consider the impact of multi-service providers with market dominant positions on 
switching costs. For example, broadband providers who own both FB and MB infrastructure can avoid 
many regulations regarding FB by encouraging their consumers to migrate to MB technology, which 
is less regulated, and subject to fewer competitors. Owning both FB and MB infrastructures can also 
provide an alternative for existing consumers and new consumers to either choose one or both 
broadband Internet connections. This will help providers keep their customers. Additionally, telecom 
providers who offer several telecom services can utilize other services related to their core business 
service by offering bundled service packages to increase customer retention. 
5.1 Paper I: The determinants of mobile subscriber retention in Sweden 
The study was conducted to examine the potential for ‘lock-in’ of Swedish mobile telephone 
subscribers. A binomial logit model is based on a 2007 telecom regulator survey. The model is 
intended to examine whether operator service attributes including termination-based price 
discrimination impact on subscriber retention. The results of the study suggest operator brand image 
management effort is fruitful. Furthermore, low on-net prices negatively affect retention. This suggests 
that termination-based price discrimination could encourage a higher level of competition in the 
market. This pricing strategy could promote switching behaviour of existing mobile subscribers. In 
addition, subscribers of larger operators are more likely to remain with their operator. Meanwhile, 
subscribers of smaller operators, in particular mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs), are least 
likely to be loyal. This suggests that larger operators (Telia, Tele2, and Telenor) can ‘lock in’ their 
existing subscribers. Moreover, on-net or termination-based price discrimination variables are 
considered along with operator variables. Their combined positive effect suggests that Telia and Tele2 
can utilize the termination-based prices better than other operators. That is, existing Telia and Tele2 
subscribers are more likely to be loyal. Meanwhile, Telenor and MVNOs report negative total effects, 
even though they implemented similar termination-based price plans. Hence, the study concludes that 
termination-based price strategies enable larger operators to gain competitive advantage. This creates 
high switching barriers for large-operator subscribers due to low on-net prices. Consequently, 
termination-based price strategies could stimulate market concentration. 
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5.2 Paper II: Termination-based price discrimination and mobile subscriber attraction in 
Sweden 
The first study pays attention on impacts of termination-based price discrimination to lock in existing 
mobile customers in Sweden. The second paper is conducted to provide a complete picture of impacts 
of termination-based price discrimination on attracting new customers by using the Swedish mobile 
phone market as a case study. In this market, mobile operators have offered termination-based price 
discrimination to their customers since 2003. Therefore, the study empirically investigates roles of 
termination-based price discrimination, on-net prices, size of existing mobile subscribers, and tariff-
mediated network effects on the number of new mobile subscribers.  
The results show that price differential between on- and off-net prices (termination-based price 
discrimination) tends to result in the operator gaining additional mobile subscribers. However, setting 
too high a price differential between on- and off-net calls may not attract new mobile subscribers.  
Further, the size of a network has a positive impact on attracting new mobile customers in this market, 
with a larger number of existing mobile subscribers leading to greater additional mobile customers. 
These findings are in line with prior studies that state that the mobile operators with a larger number of 
customers will gain more new subscribers than operators who have smaller groups of customers. 
Lastly, larger mobile operators could not apply tariff-mediated network effects to gain new mobile 
subscribers in the period of study. Nevertheless, it is possible that larger mobile operators would gain 
more benefits from termination-based price discrimination, and this may be potentially harm smaller 
mobile operators, as well as impair competition in the market in the long run. 
5.3 Paper III: Paying less with local network effects? An empirical analysis of the Swedish 
mobile communications market 
As mentioned in the literature review chapter, network effects may be localized. Certain groups of 
adopters may matter more than a whole population. This third study was conducted to investigate the 
roles of local network effects in the Swedish mobile communications market. The study has three 
objectives. The first aim is to investigate the determining factors taken into account when consumers 
choose a mobile operator. The second aim is to identify individual characteristics that affect the 
importance consumers attach to local network effects. The last objective is to examine whether users 
who value network effects (network effects oriented) pay lower monthly bills than other users, as they 
are typically more aware. A Web-based survey of the Swedish mobile communications market in 2011 
was distributed to online communities living in every part of Sweden, and data were analysed by 
employing the factor analysis, cluster analysis and econometric models. 
The findings relating to the first objective indicate that Swedish mobile consumers take three factors 
into account when subscribing to a specific mobile operator: bundling, local network effects (including 
on-net prices and social network members with the same operator), and service quality and tariffs. 
According to cluster analysis, characteristics of mobile consumers can be used to classify them into 
four groups: (1) Bundling-driven, (2) Network-effects-oriented, (3) No specific pattern, and (4) 
Quality- and tariff-oriented, even though the respondents are heterogeneous.  
As mentioned, this paper also aims to investigate what the characteristics of the network-effects-
oriented group are. The findings show that price awareness, experience of changing mobile operator, 
spending on voice communications and being younger than 25 years old, could contribute to being a 
member of this group. In addition, members of the network-effects-oriented group pay lower monthly 
bills than the other groups, although this is not statistically significant. Moreover, considering the 
network-oriented variable along with operator variables, the combined negative effect suggests that 
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mobile consumers of small operators (Telenor and Tre) pay substantially more than those of large 
operators (Telia and Tele2), even though these group of consumers take local network effects into 
account, and all of the operators offered a discount on on-net calls. Therefore, the local network effects 
can create switching barrier for consumers of larger mobile operators and also put the smaller mobile 
operators at disadvantage.  
5.4 Paper IV: Fixed and mobile broadband substitution in Sweden 
Sweden is one of leading countries in broadband infrastructure development. FB and MB networks 
have been deployed nationwide, and now are available in most populated areas. In recent years, MB 
subscription has increased substantially, and its speed has also improved. Some people consider MB is 
a substitute service to FB, but some do not. It is interesting to investigate the state of complementarity 
and substitution in the Swedish broadband market. Importantly, FB and MB providers in Sweden are 
the same players. It will be more likely that those providers who provide both broadband platforms 
can avoid high level of regulation in FB by encouraging their customers to migrate to MB services 
supplied by the same provider. 
This study is conducted on the basis of the 2009 PTS survey, and prices for broadband services 
obtaining from providers. The model has been estimated by using the nested logit model. Through an 
estimated model, the effects of price, socio-economic background, type of housing and service 
provider on the likelihood of broadband usage are analyzed. The findings indicate that price and 
housing type are the most important determinants for broadband connections. In addition, the living 
areaneighbourhood and service provider affect the probability of broadband access. In particular, the 
provider's own price and cross-price elasticities show that MB is a substitute service for FB in most 
geographic areas of Sweden. The magnitude of substitution varies by area. 
5.5 Paper V: An empirical analysis of multiple services and choices of consumer in the Swedish 
telecommunications market 
It is commonly known that telecom operators in most countries provide ‘multiple services’, in 
particular, horizontal integration services (fixed telephony, mobile telephony, fixed broadband and 
Internet access). Some telecom providers may provide cable TV and/or mobile broadband Internet 
access. Recently, telecom operators put their services into baskets that are sold for a single price.  
Sweden shows a 22% increase in bundling service adoption between 2006 and 200917. To understand 
the multiple and bundling services situation in the Swedish telecommunications market, this study 
discusses the current situation of multiple and bundle services and examines the determining factors 
that explain the consumers’ decision to buy multiple services. This study was conducted using the 
2009 PTS survey. The model is estimated using a Generalized Poisson regression model. The effects 
of discounts, service provider, socio-economic background, type of housing, and area of residence on 
the likelihood of buying multiple services is analysed through an estimated model. The results show 
that discounts, and service providers, education, level of income and area of residence are the major 
determinants for multiple services adoption. 
The study confirms the findings from theoretical literature that service providers use a discount as a 
price discrimination instrument and their market positions, cable TV and telecommunications service 
incumbents, to lock-in existing consumers. The incumbent in the cable TV and telecommunications 
                                                     
17 This is according to the E-Communications Household Survey. This survey is requested by Directorate-
General for the Information Society and Media, coordinated by Directorate for Communication. 
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services expands its market position by adding other relevant services to its core business. Switching 
costs and market definition for bundled services have become important issues for the 
telecommunications regulator to investigate. 
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6.  ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Chapter 6 contains three sections. Section 6.1 and 6.2 provide the answers for the two sub-research 
questions. The last section presents some possible policy recommendations to the telecom regulator. 
These recommendations aim to reduce consumer switching costs, increase the level of competition, 
and provide a better analysis of competition in this market. 
6.1 Tariff-mediated network effects and local network effects induce switching costs for mobile 
subscribers 
Mobile operators introduce a termination-based price discrimination strategy by charging lower prices 
for calls placed in their own network and higher price for calls placed to other networks. This strategy 
aims to retain existing mobile customers and attract new ones. The results of this dissertation 
confirmed these arguments. 
The finding shows that the combined positive effect of the advantage of size of network and low on-
net price of a larger mobile network encourages existing subscribers to remain with larger mobile 
operators. This is in line with a study by Gerpott (2008) that showed that termination-discriminatory 
pricing erects switching costs for consumers, and makes consumers may favour remaining with larger 
mobile operators. This suggests that termination-based price discrimination could make mobile 
subscribers of larger operators, such as Telia and Tele2, unwilling to switch to other mobile operators. 
Particularly, existing subscribers of larger mobile operators could benefit from low on-net prices to a 
large number of subscribers within the same network. Larger mobile operators could raise switching 
costs by creating tariff-mediated network effects. This could help prevent their customers from 
changing mobile operators, and will reduce the level of competition in the Swedish mobile 
communications market.    
Termination-based price discrimination strategy could also be seen as a high barrier for subscribers of 
larger operators who may wish to switch to other networks. Subscribers who belong to large networks 
with many subscribers prefer not to switch to relatively small operators, since they receive larger 
network effects from the large number of consumers. In addition, mobile subscribers face different 
levels of switching costs, depending on their operators. Mobile subscribers of Telia, Tele2 and Telenor 
are more likely to remain with the current operators than are Hi3G subscribers. Meanwhile, 
subscribers of mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) are less likely to remain with their current 
operators. In other words, the mobile network providers (Telia, Tele2, and Telenor), can lock in their 
existing subscribers, but the virtual operators cannot. In addition, the subscribers of Telia are 
confronted with the highest switching costs, followed by those of Tele2, Telenor and the MVNOs. 
In addition, brand image appears to be a significant factor to lock in existing subscribers in the 
Swedish mobile telephony market. This result is in line with the conclusions of previous studies 
(Gerpott et al., 2001; Chen & Hitt, 2002; Kim et al., 2004; Kim & Yoon, 2004) that service attributes 
can significantly determine the ‘decision to remain’ of subscribers. If mobile operators retain their 
brand image investment, their subscribers are more likely to remain with them.  
Since mobile operators in Sweden have used termination-based price discrimination for several years, 
it is important to investigate the impacts of this price discrimination strategy on the attractiveness of 
mobile operators. 
Findings of the thesis show that mobile operators can utilize termination-based price discrimination to 
successfully attract new mobile subscribers. Setting a higher gap between on- and off-net prices could 
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lead to additional mobile subscribers. However, if mobile operators set too huge a gap between on- 
and off-net prices, the number of new mobile subscribers will decrease. This may indicate that mobile 
subscribers may be aware that they cannot avoid making off-net calls. Then, setting too high prices 
between on- and off-net may not attract new mobile subscribers. Furthermore, on-net prices have a 
negative impact on the number of new mobile subscribers. It is obvious that if mobile operators set 
high on-net prices, they will not attract new mobile subscribers. Moreover, size of network has a 
significant impact on attracting new mobile customers in the Swedish market. More existing mobile 
subscribers will lead to even more mobile customers. In other words, new mobile customers make a 
decision to subscribe to a mobile network by considering the size of existing mobile subscribers of 
mobile operators. These results are in line with prior studies (e.g. Kim & Kwon, 2003; Fu, 2004) 
which state that the operators who have installed a certain critical mass of subscribers will 
subsequently attract more new subscribers than the others who have not.  
Interestingly, a finding of this thesis indicates that tariff-mediated network effects could not enable 
larger mobile operators to gain new mobile subscribers in the period of study. This result contradicts 
the findings of prior studies (e.g. Fu, 2004; Birke & Swann, 2006, 2010; Hoernig, 2007; Gabrielsen & 
Vagstad, 2008; Grajek, 2010; Harbord & Pagnozzi, 2010). However, this situation may be one that 
prevailed on the Swedish mobile communications market during the period of study. For example, 
Hi3G, the smallest mobile operator, implemented termination-based greater price discrimination 
heavier than other mobile operators in order to gain market share and establish itself in the market. 
Hi3G charges lower prices on both on- and off-net calls (see Figure 6) than other mobile operators. 
Hence, Hi3G was able to attract new mobile subscribers, and this may also indicate that new mobile 
subscribers do not consider the benefits of tariff-mediated network effects when they make their 
decisions to subscribe to mobile operators.  
         
Figure 6 Comparison of average on- and off- net prices among mobile operators 
Source: PTS Statistics Portal 
Note: Prices are average prices on two minutes call with connection fee. 
However, all mobile operators had set similar on- and off-net prices in 2007 and 2009. Larger mobile 
operators may gain more benefits from termination-based price discrimination because all of mobile 
operators set closer prices to each other for both on- and off-net calls during the last three years of the 
analysis (2007 - 2009). New mobile subscribers, in this later period, may have consider the benefits of 
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tariff-mediated network effects and made decisions to subscribe to mobile operators with a larger 
subscriber-base in a near future since they can make cheap calls to more subscribers within the same 
network.  
 
Figure 7 Off-net calls percentage 
Source: PTS Statistics Portal 
In addition, the implementation of termination-based price discrimination has also resulted in a biased 
proportion of off-net calls for Swedish mobile operators. Call traffic between large and small networks 
will not be in balance (see Figure 7), even though there is the same probability of each mobile 
subscriber calling the other (‘balanced calling pattern’) (Hoernig, 2007; Harbord & Pagnozzi, 2010).  
Approximately 25% of the calls had been made outside the network, in the case of Telia and Tele2, 
while more than 50% of calls made from Telenor and Hi3G are in that category. Customers of larger 
mobile operators will have higher probability of placing and receiving calls within the same network. 
At the same time, customers of smaller mobile operators will tend to place calls outside their 
networks, since most have contracted with rival mobile operators. Hence, larger mobile operators will 
receive a greater revenue stream from termination charges as there will be a higher probability of 
smaller mobile operators will place off-net calls with them, and a lower probability of subscribers with 
large operators placing off-net calls to subscribers of smaller mobile operators.  
One may argue that this situation can happen even without the introduction of termination-based price 
discrimination. However, with termination-based price discrimination, larger mobile operators will 
gain even greater benefit than smaller mobile operators. Larger mobile operators can force their 
customers to make most of their calls within the network by setting high on- and off-net price 
differentials. Subscribers, then, will consider remaining with larger mobile operators and new 
subscriber will tend to choose larger mobile operators as resulted from tariff-mediated network effects. 
Therefore, existing and new subscribers will consider this impact when making a decision to switch 
and subscribe to another mobile operator.  
Not only tariff-mediated network effects can stimulate consumer switching costs in mobile 
communications, but local network effects can also play a significant role in creating consumer 
switching costs.  
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In mobile communications, the recent empirical literature (Birke & Swann, 2005, 2006, 2010; 
Corrocher & Zirulia, 2009; Maicas et al, 2009a) conclude that local network effects will exist if 
customers’ decision to choose a mobile operator is influenced more by his social subset than by the 
rest of the users in the network. In addition, a mobile subscriber will be better off if he has the same 
operator as the person(s) he calls most, as it will be more convenient and his monthly bill will be less, 
as a result of low on-net prices. Ultimately, local network effects would encourage a mobile user and 
his social network members to be subscribers of the same mobile operators because they could benefit 
from paying a cheaper monthly bill. Therefore, local network effects could induce consumer switching 
costs. 
The results of this thesis demonstrate that ‘local network effects’ are one of three important factors18 
for subscribing to a specific mobile operator in Sweden. Mobile subscribers consider it important to 
have their family members, friends, and partners subscribe with the same mobile operator. Moreover, 
mobile subscribers also consider the importance of low on-net tariff when subscribing to a mobile 
operator. They can, then, make calls to their local network easier and cheaper since the calls are made 
within the same network.  
The results of this thesis also show that mobile subscribers in this market are heterogeneous. They can 
be categorized into four groups. One of the groups is ‘network-effects-oriented group’. It consists of 
mobile users who choose their carrier by taking the benefits of network effects into consideration. The 
members of this group are driven, in particular, by price awareness, pre-paid subscriptions, and the 
experience of changing mobile operator. This reveals that members of the network-effects-oriented 
group are aware of mobile tariffs and spend time studying and screening different options before 
adopting a specific mobile operator. In addition, members of this group pay lower monthly bills than 
others. However, the difference is not statistically significant. This result is similar to that reached by 
studies by Corrocher and Zirulia (2009) and Huacap and Heimeshoff (2011) showing that consumers 
who take into account the choice of their social contacts when choosing their own operator pay lower 
monthly bills. 
Moreover, the results show that small operators’ customers (Telenor and Hi3G) pay significant higher 
monthly bills than customers of large operators (Telia and Tele2), even though these consumers are 
member of the network-effects-oriented group and all of the operators offered a discount on on-net 
calls. This result suggests that local network effects can create switching barriers for mobile 
subscribers. In particular, consumers of larger mobile operators who are aware of benefits of local 
network effects, can take advantage of being in the same network as their social network members, 
and also benefit from paying lower monthly bills. Local network effects would be a disadvantage for 
consumers of smaller mobile operators since these consumers have to pay higher monthly bill. In the 
long run, when more mobile subscribers realize the advantages of local network effects and become 
members of the network-effects-oriented group, they and their social network member will consider 
moving to larger mobile operators in order to receive the benefit of lower bills. This will be to the 
detriment of smaller mobile operators. 
6.2 Multi-service provision generates switching costs 
The switching costs do not exist only in the mobile communications market but they are also present 
with regard to other telecommunications services. Telecom operators introduce more services to 
                                                     
18 Two other factors are bundling and quality and tariff of service. 
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maintain their market position and to win customer loyalty by offering several broadband Internet 
technologies and bundling services. 
In Sweden, broadband Internet service providers offer several broadband technologies (both FB and 
MB), to their customers. FB includes DSL, cable, and fibre technology. Telia, Tele2, and 
Bredbandsbolaget offer all kind of broadband Internet connections. Meanwhile Com Hem, an 
incumbent carrier for cable TV services, provides two main Internet connections - cable modem and 
MB. Several small players, including many municipalities and private companies, are providing fibre 
broadband connections. Tre (Hi3G), the smallest mobile network provider, also entered the market to 
compete for MB subscribers. However, considering both FB and MB providers, they are almost 
identical broadband service providers. It suggests that people have several choices of broadband 
Internet access but there are relative fewer broadband Internet providers to choose. 
Recently, MB has experienced substantial growth in the Swedish broadband Internet market. At mid-
2010, MB penetration was 25 per 100 inhabitants and covered 99% of the populated areas. MB 
subscribers can access the Internet at speeds of 3.1 – 14.4 Mbit/s, which is comparable to DSL 
technology. Moreover, prices of MB are relatively lower than DSL and fibre technology with the 
comparable speed. This may place a high uncertainty factor on FB services since subscribers may 
prefer to switch to MB. The issue of substitution between FB and MB should be investigated. 
Nonetheless, different populated areas have different broadband Internet connections available. 
The geographical areas in Sweden are divided according to the availability of broadband technologies. 
Area 1 refers to regions where consumers can choose DSL, cable, fibre, or MB as a primary 
broadband Internet access. Area 2 are the areas where DSL, fibre, and MB are available, with Area 3 
having only DSL and MB accessible for consumers. 
The results of the thesis show that DSL and MB are sensitive to price changes for its own price than 
cable, and LAN/Fibre. The non-zero of cross price elasticities indicates that FB connections substitute 
for MB, in particular DSL and MB. The magnitude of substitution varies by area. 
For Area 1, the results show that the own-price elasticity of all types of broadband connection is 
greater than 1 and this indicates that broadband Internet access is elastic. Demand for broadband 
access is sensitive to price changes. In addition, the cross-price elasticity is non-zero and this result 
confirms that different broadband Internet technologies in this area can be substituted. Interestingly, 
DSL and MB have relatively high cross-price elasticity. This suggests that these types of broadband 
Internet access are close substitutes. However, cable broadband connection has the smallest cross-
price elasticity. This reveals that subscribers of cable connections are less sensitive regarding changes 
in price for the broadband technology of other providers. 
Similarly, the results from Area 2 indicate that demand for all of broadband connection is elastic. 
Own-price elasticities are in range of -1.553 to -2.667. LAN/Fibre is, however, less sensitive on price 
changes of broadband connection of others. Moreover, the magnitude of cross price elasticities is in 
range of 0.370 to 0.845. The non-zero cross-price elasticity suggests that all broadband connections 
are substitutable.  
In addition, the results of cross-price elasticities of Area 3 also indicate little substitution between DSL 
and MB, since the magnitude of cross price-elasticities are 0.163 and 0.811. This may indicate that 
those users who are still using DSL do not perceive MB as an equally good substitute. In other words, 
MB could not be in the same market as DSL in this area. 
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There are many possible reasons explaining the FB and MB substitution in the Swedish market. One 
possible explanation is that multi-service broadband providers want to avoid a higher level of 
regulation on the FB market by putting an attractive promotion on MB. For example, broadband 
providers charge lower prices on MB at a comparable speed of connection. By doing so, multi-service 
broadband providers will not lose any of their broadband customers because the customers just 
migrate from FB to MB technology. The results are in line with Ida and Sakahira (2008) who conclude 
that broadband subscribers desire to move from an old to a newer broadband technology within the 
same carriers. This confirms that multi-service provision of broadband providers can create switching 
costs by offering multi-platform broadband services. Broadband customers will more likely to choose 
a new broadband service within the same service providers. 
Moreover, telecom operators in Sweden currently have a horizontal integration in their service 
structure. The E-Communications Household Survey of the European Commission, Sweden shows a 
22% increase in bundling service adoption between 2006 (21%) and 2009 (43%). 
This calls attention the need to study the determinants of buying multiple services and the impacts of 
buying more services from the same services provider, in particular, on switching costs in the Swedish 
telecommunications market. The results demonstrate that the discount for buying more services from 
the same operator has a positive effect on the decisions of consumers. It suggests that consumers who 
receive discounts have a higher probability (0.82 times) of buying bundle services or selecting more 
services to be included in their service basket than consumers who buy individual services. The 
discount offering can lock in and stimulate the consumers to include more services in their service 
basket. This indicates that multi-service providers utilizing their capability to provide multi-service 
with a discount could create switching costs for their customers, since the consumers tend to buy more 
telecom services from the same providers. This result fits well with prior literature (e.g. Stremerch & 
Tellis, 2002; Agarwal & Frambach, 2003; Crawford, 2008; Economides, 2010). 
Importantly, the results of the thesis show that the current customers of an incumbent cable TV 
operator (Com Hem) and an incumbent telecom provider (Telia) tend to buy more telecom services 
from their current providers. This indicates that the current consumers of these providers are locked in. 
They prefer to add more telecom services from their current providers rather than from others. Search 
costs and the costs of uncertainty may also encourage consumers to use the service from the service 
provider they have used (Crampes & Hollander, 2006)19. This confirms that multi-service providers 
who have a dominant position in a specific telecom service could utilize their dominant position to 
encourage their existing customers to buy more services. 
                                                     
19 Crampes and Hollander (2006) demonstrate that incumbent telephone operators can use bundling to retain a 
competitive advantage over older customers because these customers are less likely to switch to new and 
unfamiliar providers. However, cable operators may capture younger consumers since they are already familiar 
with mobile telephony and the Iternet. 
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Figure 8 Current situation of various players in term of service offering 
Source: Partly adopted from Pernet (2006) 
The results of the thesis also indicate that customers of Com Hem have higher probability (0.75) to put 
more services in their basket than customers of Telia (0.55). Com Hem has only cable TV as its core 
business, while Telia is considered a leader in all telecom services (see Figure2, Table 4, and Figure 
7). The reason could be Com Hem that already has the expertise to program TV content and perhaps 
provide relatively more attractive content. Its TV content could lead its customers to prefer to buy 
more related services from Com Hem. This is in line with the study by Lee (2009). Lee suggests that 
the company would benefit if it makes efforts to differentiate through video services other than voice 
and data services. This may suggests that TV content or video is one of potential factors for inducing 
consumers buy more services. 
6.3 Policy Implications 
6.3.1 Bill-and-keep and price awareness campaign  
This thesis finds that the implementation of termination-based price discrimination and the existence 
of local network effects are the main components of switching costs confronted by mobile subscribers 
on the Swedish mobile communications market.  
To reduce and prevent the potential impacts of tariff-mediated network effects, one possible 
recommendation would be to change the interconnection charge scheme toward a bill-and-keep model. 
A move to bill-and-keep relative to the mobile termination charge would possibly result in a more 
efficient wholesale and retail price structure. This pricing scheme will not allow mobile operators to 
charge termination fees to each other, and would set zero termination charges. Then, incumbents could 
not set a high termination charge to raise their rivals’ off-net prices. This would mean that operators 
would not have an incentive to set different prices between on- and off-net calls if they cannot utilize 
termination-based price discrimination to create attractiveness for mobile customers (Harbord & 
Hoernig, 2010). Moreover, incumbents would have no incentive to encourage their customers to place 
most calls within their own network, since they will not pay and get money from interconnection 
services. 
Mobile telephony Fixed telephony Internet access TV
Telecom operators
  Telia
  Tele2
  Telenor
Internet access providers
  Bredbandsbolaget (Telenor) IP-telephony IPTV
Cable operator
  Com Hem
Core business
Extented business
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In addition, a bill-and-keep scheme can also be used to avoid the bottleneck monopoly problem that 
usually appears when the calling party pays (Littlechild, 2006). Harbord & Pagnozzi (2010) indicate 
that the countries which apply bill-and-keep (Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States), 
have lower retail prices in the mobile communications market. Harbord & Hoernig (2010) confirm 
that moving to much lower mobile termination rates with bill-and-keep often results in the largest 
increase in overall welfare. It also eliminates barriers to entry caused by ‘tariff-mediated network 
effects’, increasing competition and welfare in mobile markets in the long run. Last but not least, a 
bill-and-keep arrangement would be simple to put in practice and it would give higher incentive to 
invest (Cambini & Valletti, 2003). Some authors have suggested that a regime based on ‘bill-and-
keep’ is an efficiency way of sharing the value created by a call when both callers and receivers 
benefit from it (DeGraba, 2003) and it would indeed increase general welfare, compared to cost-based 
access pricing (Berger, 2005). It is also costly and time consuming for regulators to investigate real 
costs of interconnection (Stennek & Tangerås, 2008). Bill-and-keep would instead eliminate the need 
for regulatory intervention and enable telecom regulators to devote their resources to other necessary 
policies. 
Switching costs caused by local network effects may also be reduced if price awareness campaigns can 
be implemented by telecom regulators. A price awareness campaign aims at encouraging mobile 
subscribers to carefully study their price plans. This will make mobile subscribers more well-informed 
consumers.  
In fact, the Swedish telecom regulator established the telecom price-comparison website20 to promote 
price information of telecom services. This website provides price information for all kinds of telecom 
services, including mobile price plans. It is helpful to the consumer as he/she can select the average 
number of minutes for on-net calls and/or off-net calls and the number of SMS per month. Then, the 
website will suggest the mobile carrier who offers the lowest monthly bill. However, the price-
comparison website needs to be emphasized by the regulator to ensure that mobile consumers are 
well-informed. When the mobile subscribers are informed customers, they will seek to minimize their 
costs. At the same time, they will also look for a better service quality. This will probably raise the 
level of competition, in both price and quality of service, in the Swedish mobile communications 
market.  
6.3.2 Market definitions for bundling services and broadband Internet access 
In general, the market definition of telecom services is defined explicitly for fixed telephony, mobile 
telephony and the Internet market. These markets are regulated by the telecom regulator. Market 
definition does not cover bundled service, however. An examination of competition on individual 
telecom service may be different from the investigation of bundled service. For instance, the regulators 
may observe that the competition in double-play (e.g. broadband Internet and fixed telephony) is less 
competitive, adequate competition may be found in both broadband Internet and fixed telephony, 
when these are examined individually. Thus, it is important for the telecommunications regulator to 
determine the market definition for bundled services separately. 
In addition, it is obvious that the market definition for broadband Internet access should be revised if 
there is evidence indicating that FB and MB are substituted services. The findings of the thesis have 
shown that FB and MB can be substituted services in some geographical areas in Sweden. The 
Swedish telecom regulator should, therefore, continue its investigation on the issue of substitution 
                                                     
20 www.telepriskollen.se 
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between FB and MB and perhaps prepare to revise market definitions for broadband and relating 
competition regulations. Moreover, geographical market definition should be taken into consideration 
when redefining broadband market definitions. The empirical examination suggests that in different 
residential areas, broadband subscribers are confronted with different sets of broadband alternatives. 
One area may have a higher degree of substitution than others. Geographical market definitions will 
provide useful information for the telecom regulator in evaluating competition in broadband market. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1 Conclusions 
The literature shows that network effects and multi-service provision can impact social welfare both 
positively and negatively. This thesis aims to provide evidence indicating that network effects, in 
particular those caused by termination-based price discrimination and calling clubs, as well as multi-
service provision, can potentially raise consumer switching costs in the Swedish telecom market. Two 
research questions were then formulated to examine the impacts from network effects and multi-
service provision. The first research question is as follows:  
RQ1: “What is the impact of termination-based price discrimination and calling clubs on consumer 
switching costs?” 
The empirical findings from this thesis show that mobile operators, in particular larger ones, can 
utilize termination-based price discrimination together with their size of subscribers-based, tariff-
mediated network effects, to lock in existing subscribers. Larger mobile operators can use these effects 
to raise consumer switching costs by reducing consumers' willingness to switch. Hence, subscribers of 
larger mobile operators face high switching costs. At the same time, mobile operators can also use 
termination-based price discrimination to compete for new mobile subscribers. Larger mobile 
operators tend to gain more new mobile subscribers. But the larger mobile operators were not able to 
use tariff-mediated network effects to gain new mobile subscribers during the period studies. 
However, there is a possibility that larger mobile operators can utilize tariff-mediated network effects 
in a near future since both larger and smaller mobile operators now charge similar prices on both on- 
and off-net calls. Subscribing to smaller mobile operators would not produce the same benefits as 
larger ones. New mobile subscribers may tend to subscribe with larger mobile operators instead of the 
smaller ones. 
The empirical findings also show that mobile subscribers in this market are heterogeneous. They can 
be divided into four different groups. One of the groups, network-effects-oriented, takes ‘calling clubs’ 
and ‘low on-net tariff’ into account when they subscribe to a specific mobile operator. Members of 
this group can make calls at cheaper prices to their calling club and pay lower monthly bill than those 
who are not. The members of this group who are subscribers of smaller operators (Telenor and Hi3G) 
pay a higher monthly bill than those of large operators (Telia and Tele2), even though all of the 
operators offered a similar discount on on-net calls. This suggests that local network effects21can 
create switching barriers for mobile subscribers. Particularly, consumers of larger mobile operators 
who are aware of benefits of local network effects can take advantage of being in the same network as 
their social network members and also benefit from paying less on their monthly bill. However, local 
network effects would give a disadvantage to consumers of smaller mobile operators since they have 
to pay higher monthly bills, even though they are aware of the benefits of local network effects. 
As described in Chapter 2, mobile operators in Sweden do not only operate in wireless voice 
communication, but most also provide MB and others FB to end customers. They also offer fixed 
telephony, TV services, and bundled packages. Major market players are almost the same in each 
                                                     
21 The appended Paper III shows that local network effects can be caused by calling clubs and termination-based 
price discrimination. Certain smaller groups of customers matter more than a whole population of mobile 
subscribers. 
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telecom service. In other words, telecom providers in Sweden have multi-service provision. The 
second research question is as follows: 
RQ2: What is the impact of multi-service provision on consumer switching costs? 
The thesis shows that the cross price elasticities of FB and MB are positive. When prices of FB 
increase, the probability of using MB also increases, and vice versa. This means that FB and MB are 
substitution services in most part of Sweden. However, the magnitude of substitution varies by area.  
As mentioned, most of broadband providers in Sweden are multi-platform broadband providers, 
providing both FB and MB across the country.  They can take advantage of this situation by running 
an attractive promotion on MB to avoid a higher level of regulation on FB. Hence, there will be a high 
possibility that broadband customers will migrate from FB to MB technology within the same 
providers. As a result, broadband providers will not lose any of their broadband customers because 
their customers can switch from FB to MB technology. These can suggest that multi-service provision 
of broadband providers can create switching costs by offering multi-platform broadband services. 
Broadband customers will more likely to choose a new broadband service within the same service 
providers. 
Receiving a bundle of services can also increase a consumer’s switching costs. Providers usually sell 
several telecom services together as a package for a discounted single price. The empirical findings of 
this thesis reveal that the discount is an important factor making customers buy more services from the 
same operator. This indicates that the discount offered can stimulate consumer lock-in since 
consumers will tend to buy more services from the operators they already have experience with.  
Moreover, an incumbent cable TV operator (Com Hem) and an incumbent telecom provider (Telia) 
tend to have higher advantage than other multi-service providers. Their customers will put more 
services into the service basket. This indicates that customers of these providers have higher switching 
costs than customers of other service providers, and confirms the fact that multi-service providers who 
have a dominant position in a specific telecom service can utilize their dominant position to encourage 
their existing customers to buy more services. 
Concluding remarks 
From the thesis’s findings, it has been observed that larger telecom operators can use their customer-
based and termination-based price discrimination, local network effects, and multi-service provision to 
raise consumer switching costs (see Figure 8). With these strategies, dominant telecom providers can 
increase consumer switching costs to strengthen their dominant position. If there is no further 
intervention by the telecom regulator, dominant players will be stronger and perhaps can take all 
customers.     
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Figure 9 Summary of findings 
7.2 Future research 
The results of this thesis show that strategic instruments, such as termination-based price 
discrimination and calling clubs, can produce consumer switching costs in the Swedish mobile 
telephony market. However, there is no clear evidence indicating that larger mobile operators can be 
able to utilize tariff-mediated network effects to attract new mobile subscribers. A future investigation 
of this issue is needed. In addition, there are other factors that could explain switching costs in mobile 
telephony, such as handset subsidies. Mobile operators sell handset at a substantial discount as part of 
a long-term (often 24 months) subscription contract. In Sweden, mobile operators do not simply give 
free mobile terminals to their new customers. They apply a monthly payment basis to a customer 
instead of a full-amount payment when a customer wants to subscribe to their networks. The mobile 
customer must have a certain period of subscription in order to get such a discount. Hence, it would be 
interesting to investigate the empirical impacts of handset subsidy on consumer switching costs in this 
market as a future research project. 
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MNP was implemented in Sweden beginning in late 2001. Mobile subscribers can switch mobile 
operators while retaining the same mobile number free of charge. However, of the 10% of Swedish 
mobile subscribers who switched to other operators in 2007, only 7% utilized their MNP rights. This 
may suggest inefficiency in implementing MNP. An investigation of determinants for non-MNP 
adopters is worth undertaking, and should take into account duration of porting and consumer 
awareness of MNP. 
Mobile operators currently offer several price plans to their subscribers. They revise their price plans 
regularly in order to compete with their rivals. Mobile subscribers, then, have at least three alternatives 
when making a decision: not making a change, changing their price plan within the same operator, and 
changing mobile operators. The results of this study will be helpful for both telecom operators and the 
telecom authority in the revision of their business plans and related regulations. 
The thesis has also discussed that FB and MB, as substituted services in Sweden. The results implicitly 
indicate that there is a possibility that current FB customers will switch to MB service within the same 
operator. However, this issue has not been explicitly investigated in this thesis due to data limitation. 
In addition, speed of connection and prices are currently comparable for both FB and MB technology. 
It is important for the telecom regulator as well as broadband providers to know the probability of 
migration from FB to MB technology within the same provider. The results will provide insights for 
the telecom regulator to analyze related regulations (i.e. infrastructure investment and spectrum 
allocations, as well as market definitions). Telecom operators will benefit from future research when 
setting up new business plans.  
Last but not least, it is important to investigate switching among broadband technologies. Since 
several broadband Internet access technologies are available for consumers in Sweden, people are able 
to choose any broadband Internet access, and perhaps free to switch to other broadband technologies. 
The results will be useful for the telecom regulator as a way of showing how infrastructure-based or 
multiple platforms competition works. It can also point out the major obstacles to switching broadband 
providers and technologies.  
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